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WahhabismContents:Executive Director Schwartz, CIP International Director Al-Alawi, "The Crisis of the Wahhabi Regime," The Weekly Standard, issue of July 16, 2007 "Bosniak language version" of the column "Judeocentrism: A New Slur?" Executive Director Schwartz, "Judeocentrism," Family Security Matters, May 16, 2007 Executive Director Schwartz, "CAIR Feels the Heat," Family Security Matters, May 9. 2007 Executive Director Schwartz, "Is Terrorism Infinite?" -- Family Security Matters, January 16, 2007 Executive Director Schwartz, "2007 Predictions and Hopes," Family Security Matters, January 5, 2007 Executive Director Schwartz, "2007 Predictions and Hopes," Family Security Matters, January 5, 2007
Stephen Schwartz
First, I pray for stabilization in Iraq, with a lessening of risk to our and
the coalition’s military forces there.
Second, I pray for the security of all Americans and other people against
terrorism, and for adequate resources and support to those protecting them.
I further pray that Western governments will not be lured into the trap of
collaboration with fake Muslim moderates, but will assist genuine moderate
Muslims in defeating radicalism.
To improve the situation of the global Muslim ummah and the planet in
general, I fervently pray that Saudi King Abdullah will rapidly and
decisively prevail over the backward elements of the royal family. I pray
Abdullah will break the monopoly of Wahhabi Islam over religious life in the
kingdom, restoring pluralism within Islam, and proclaiming general religious
liberty with a written constitution, independent judiciary, and free
media. In addition, I pray that all financing of international Wahhabi
expansionism be cut off.
These are not utopian hopes; the Hejaz region of Arabia, which includes
Mecca and Medina, had laid the foundations of such a system before the
Wahhabi takeover in the 1920s. Saudi Arabia today has a growing middle class
pressing against the old regime, and demanding to live in a normal society.
Next, I pray the domestic student, labor, and moderate religious opposition
will prevail in Iran, driving Ahmadinejad from office.
Finally, I pray that Jews, Christians, Muslims and other believers will
initiate a meaningful, respectful dialogue about the future of humanity. Executive Director Schwartz, "Is Terrorism Infinite?" -- Family Security Matters, January 16, 2007
Is Terrorism Infinite?
By Stephen Schwartz
Author: Stephen Schwartz
Source: The Family Security Foundation, Inc Date: January 16, 2007
Many in Washington believe that terrorism
cannot be eradicated. Is their defeatism warranted? FSM contributing
Editor Stephen Schwartz says no, and here’s why.
Is Terrorism Infinite?
By Stephen Schwartz
I recently heard it said here in
Washington where I live and work that the phenomenon of terrorism is
infinite, and cannot be eradicated.
This argument is simply a variant
on the frequent error of Western observers who claim that Islamist
extremists are impossible to defeat because they desire death and
will not stray from their violent path.
These misconceptions have led to a
serious weakness in Western strategy – the failure to observe
contradictions and to exploit differences in the ranks of the
enemy. For this reason, U.S. and coalition leaders of the War on
Terror have neglected to encourage splits and defections in the
opposing forces.
But the issue of the impermanence
of terrorism is more significant. Certain terror movements have
endured for years, and inflicted extensive atrocities on innocent
people. These include al-Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, the Taliban, extremist
infiltrators among the Chechens, and radicals in Pakistan and
Kashmir. Outside the world of Islam, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka
have pursued a long campaign of suicide terror.
But for each example of a
long-lasting terrorist group, there are cases in which terrorism was
defeated. The Irish Republican Army was convinced to give up
terrorist activity. Before it, violent radicals including the
Italian Red Brigades, the German Red Army Faction, the American
Weatherman, and the Japanese Red Army disrupted society, but finally
vanished from the political landscape. Today’s readers have seldom
heard of the revolutionary terrorism that convulsed Europe and the
Americas at the end of the 19th century.
Terrorism can be defeated.
Islamist terrorism is no less vulnerable than its predecessors in
history.
First, Westerners need to
comprehend that Islamist terrorists are often driven not by
conviction of their rightness, but by weakness in their faith. They
join terrorist movements to prove they are good Muslims, because
they feel in their hearts that they are insufficient Muslims.
Such individuals, when faced with
actual death on the battlefields of jihadism in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and elsewhere, may realize that they are unprepared to sacrifice
their whole lives to the incitement of fanatics. It is in the
interest of the U.S. and its coalition partners to encourage such
feelings by killing the enemy, but also by psychological warfare
aimed at undermining the morale of the terrorists and offering
opportunities to defect.
I have written elsewhere that the
common trope about Islamist terrorists seeking the pleasures of
virgins in paradise often reflects personal confusion rather than
conviction. For terrorist recruits, it may seem easier to seek the
virgins in heaven than to marry and found a normal family in the
real world.
Above all, terrorism is always
dependent on extensive, external financial support. It is a
principle of war enunciated by the great German strategist
Clausewitz that “irregular,” “insurgent” combat – of which terrorism
is an evil subset – cannot survive without foreign help. The IRA
could not operate without support from Irish American sympathizers,
and when, after September 11, 2001, Irish Americans dropped their
financial backing for the movement, it was forced to abandon terror.
The German RAF and Italian Red
Brigades were supported by the Soviet KGB. When the Russians
decided to stop backing them, they collapsed. Japanese radicals and
the American Weatherman got help from North Korea, until their
subversion proved ineffective.
Terrorism without financing is
individual and isolated. Without Saudi money Osama bin Laden might
be no more than a Ted Kaczynski – the notorious Unabomber – of the
Muslim world. Both lived reclusively, but Kaczynski could hardly
even fantasize the establishment of a global network of agents.
Islamist radicalism is based on powerful interests, rather than the
oft-cited but bogus “root causes” involving U.S. and Israeli policy.
Islamic extremism is maintained by
two ideological forces hiding behind religion: Wahhabis in Saudi
Arabia and the adventuristic supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in
Iran. Syria, with a radical Arab nationalist regime that does not
embrace a religious doctrine, is a halfway house for both, mainly
for profit.
As President George W. Bush has
pointed out, Iraq has become a battleground for Sunni terrorists who
see the Shias as their main enemy on the ground, and Shia militias
anxious for revenge. American and coalition troops are mainly under
attack from Sunnis.
Sunni terrorists may be undermined
and vanquished by a combination of stern military action by the
U.S.-led coalition and their Iraqi partners, and pressure on Saudi
King Abdullah, whose government has announced that it will not favor
Sunnis over Shias in Iraq. This action may weaken all Sunni
radicals everywhere.
The Shia militias may be curbed by
consistent pressure on the new Iraqi government, which has a Shia
majority, and by continuing diplomatic efforts against Iran, in
response to the nuclear and Holocaust-denial hallucinations of
Ahmadinejad.
Terrorism is not infinite or
unbeatable. And it will be beaten, as the Red Brigades and other
brutal murderers were beaten: by arms, by psychology, and by cutting
off their foreign support.
Schwartz on Natana DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Apologist,
RealClearPolitics, January 19, 2007
January 19, 2007 Natana DeLong-Bas: American Professor, Wahhabi Apologist
Perhaps no single figure better represents the lamentable
situation of Middle East studies (MES) today than Professor
Natana J. DeLong-Bas, a Georgetown graduate who currently
teaches at Brandeis University and Boston College. Her specialty
happens to be Wahhabism, the ultrafundamentalist Islamic sect
and state religion in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism
inspires al-Qaida and its variants--including the Sunni
jihadists currently murdering U.S. and coalition troops, as well
as Shia Muslims, in Iraq.
DeLong-Bas is a professional apologist for Saudi extremism. She
recently reached a depth of mendacity about radical Islam it is
hard to imagine her exceeding. In an interview with the Saudi
daily al-Sharq al-Awsat of December 21, 2006, while
visiting the desert kingdom, DeLong-Bas announced that she had
found "no convincing evidence that Osama bin Laden was behind
the attacks on the World Trade Center." Her interview was made
public in translation by the Middle East Media Research
Institute (MEMRI) at
http://www.memri.org/.
In a long colloquy clearly intended to flatter her Saudi
patrons, DeLong-Bas claimed that she had been studying the works
of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahhabi sect, for
a decade, and had read all of them. But she was forced by a
persistent Saudi reporter to admit that she had never read the
Islamist preacher's correspondence, which critics of Wahhabism
and other Saudis consider key to understanding him. She rambled
on, claiming that Islamist terror has nothing to do with radical
religious interpretations, and with an almost absurd
predictability blamed everything wrong in the Muslim and Arab
world on the U.S. and Israel. She even described the "democracy"
of terrorist groups like Hamas and the Wahhabi agents in Somalia
as superior in achievement to U.S. democratization efforts.
Intellectually, Natana DeLong-Bas fits comfortably in the
philosophical milieu of contemporary MES. For the majority of
MES scholars in the U.S., certain cliches--little more than
slogans--have become the foundation for teaching a new
generation of American scholars. These truisms include the claim
that radical Islam is a construct fabricated by Western
"Orientalists," that all the problems of the Arab and Muslim
nations are caused by Western economic rapacity, and, of course,
that American support for Israel is the principal cause of Arab
and Muslim discontent.
Prior to September 11, a relatively unknown DeLong-Bas appeared
to be little more than one of many disciples of John L.
Esposito, a renowned Georgetown professor and Islamist apologist
who directs the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for
Muslim-Christian Understanding. She was a mere research
assistant at Georgetown, completing a dissertation on Wahhabism
and co-authoring a second edition of Esposito's volume Women in
Muslim Family Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002).
When the fact that 15 out of 19 of the 9/11 suicide squad were
Saudis came to America's attention, and scrutiny of Saudi
Wahhabism began, Esposito introduced DeLong-Bas to the media as
an "expert" to counter suspicion about the Wahhabi danger.
DeLong-Bas argued in The Boston Globe as early as 2003 that the
writings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the eponymous sect,
were moderate and unthreatening and treated other Muslims, as
well as non-Muslims, tolerantly and fairly.
This outlandish opinion, delivered in the wake of the atrocities
less than two years before, was fleshed out when her volume
Wahhabi Islam was published by Oxford University Press in 2004.
There she presented Wahhabism as anti-jihad and so benevolent as
to be even feminist. Her book seemed to have been rushed into
print with official Saudi support:
DeLong-Bas thanked such individuals as Faisal bin Salman, whose
status as a Saudi prince she failed to mention; Abd Allah S. al-Uthaymin,
son of a notoriously extreme member of the Wahhabi clerical
class in the kingdom; and Fahd as-Semmari, director of the King
Abd al-Aziz Foundation for Research and Archives in Riyadh, the
Saudi capital. She also acknowledged the latter foundation for
financial support. Even during the worst period of American
academic accommodation to Soviet Communism, in the late 1980s,
it is difficult to imagine an American academic scholar
admitting direct receipt of funding from Moscow.
But Saudi Arabia, as we all know, is different, and DeLong-Bas
is remarkably candid; she soon became the most strident defender
of Wahhabism in the West, and especially in academia.
Western politicians and academics, who determine and interpret,
respectively, the course of world affairs, are more to blame for
the public's ignorance of Middle East affairs than are the
media. As an experienced news reporter for a major American
daily, I believe most reporters simply followed the practice of
the profession. Acting as "first responders" similar to
firefighters, police, and nurses, they accumulated
quickly-observable facts and then turned to academic "experts"
to analyze them. It was among American professors of Middle East
studies, rather than on the battlefield, that truth became the
first casualty.
The totalitarian influence exercised over MES is profoundly
alarming. A small list of sensible and well-developed American
authorities in the discipline has challenged MES stereotypes,
but these critics are frequently attacked, isolated, and
ostracized.
Why should this "treason of the intellectuals" matter to
most Westerners? Because it implies treason to civilization. Its
effects may even be worse for the Muslim world than for the
West; but the field of Middle East Studies lacks any conscience
about the consequences of its practitioners' surrender to
ideology.
Stephen Schwartz is author of The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi
Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism, and Executive Director
of the Center for Islamic Pluralism [www.islamicpluralism.org].
He was a staff writer for the San Francisco Chronicle from 1989
to 1999. He writes for Campus Watch, a project of the Middle
East Forum.
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/natana_delongbas_american_prof.html
at January 20, 2007 - 03:26:24 PM CST
Executive Director Schwartz, "CAIR Feels the Heat," Family Security Matters, May 9. 2007 http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/homeland.php?id=960668 CAIR
Feels the Heat
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Long accustomed to abusing their power with impunity, the Saudi mutawiyin or "religious police" (more on that misleading translation in a moment) suddenly find themselves on the defensive. Increasingly challenged by critics, they felt compelled early this year to go through the motions of announcing a "modernization": Warrants would be required for searches, the use of force for moral violations would be banned. In practice, however, nothing changed. And when, this spring, two Saudi men died in custody, events took an unprecedented turn: Controversy erupted in the Saudi media; several mutawiyin members were dragged into court; and the boldest reformers called for dismantling altogether this hated institution. But to make the story intelligible, it is necessary to begin at the beginning--with the uniqueness of Saudi Arabia. In addition to being the only state named after its rulers, and having no constitution except the Koran, this is the homeland of the radical Wahhabi form of Sunni Islam. Wahhabism, the official sect of the kingdom, is a patched-together, relatively recent expression of the faith of Muhammad, and the Wahhabi institutions that support the Saudi order often seem amorphous and opaque. Given the general absence of transparency in the kingdom, this should come as no surprise. But there is no Wahhabi institution more difficult to define than the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Founded in the 1920s, when the Saudi state came into being, as an enforcer of collective morals, this body of at least 10,000 individuals is known to Saudi and other Muslims as the mutawiyin, or "devotees." Although often described in Western media as the "religious police," the mutawiyin have little in common with a police force--they wear no uniform and receive no salary--and are better described as an Islamofascist militia, something akin to the Nazi and Communist rank-and-file party members in lands ruled by those movements. Their mission includes ideological indoctrination in the dangers of "imitating the West" (such as watching television), but they mainly enforce Wahhabi standards of behavior in public. Their constant and degrading interference with ordinary people has brought about growing discontent. If judicial scrutiny is imposed on the mutawiyin, Saudi Arabia will undergo a profound change in its social life. A kind of adjunct to the tens of thousands of state-subsidized clerics, the mutawiyin are a pillar of Wahhabism in the kingdom. They prowl the streets of the main Saudi cities day and night. Jeddah, the commercial capital on the Red Sea, is the notable exception: Local residents claim to have run the mutawiyin out of town. Elsewhere, however, they seek out people they suspect of violating the Wahhabi code of conduct. If a woman walks outside her home in the full body covering known as the abaya but allows a fold of cloth to slip, exposing her ankle or face, the mutawiyin may scold her or strike her. If they suspect that an unrelated man and woman are meeting in public places, the patrollers may detain and harass them, insulting the female for alleged lewdness, and beating the male. If people keep walking when the call to prayer is heard and do not rush into the nearest mosque, the mutawiyin may swarm and assault them for impiety. Given the Islamic ban on intoxication, if the militia are informed that alcoholic drinks or drugs are being used in a private home, they may raid the house and beat and even kill people. If Muslim pilgrims violate the Wahhabi understanding of monotheism by praying at the shrine of Muhammad in Medina, they are likely to be taken aside and roughed up and, if they are foreign, deported. Until now, the mutawiyin have not been called to account for their sometimes drastic deeds. They have no professional standards or training. They are free to assault people and then shove them on their way, making no record of the encounter, having carried out no official arrest, and making no provision for any hearing or further punishment, although offenses deemed particularly grave--alleged adultery, say--may land the suspect before a sharia court. Members enter the mutawiyin from the kingdom's strictest schools and mosques. They are not paid, but are assigned to regular patrols. They wear no identifying uniform except a red-checkered headscarf. They travel in unmarked cars. Instead of a firearm, they carry an asaa, a long stick resembling a riding crop. But they have offices and detention centers, and both the chief Islamic cleric in the kingdom, grand mufti Abdulaziz bin Abdullah al-Sheik, and interior minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz (notorious for asserting that 9/11 was the handiwork of Israel), say the mutawiyin are supported by the state. The Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice has a chief, Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Ghaith, and has lately appointed public-relations representatives, still unpaid. The mutawiyin have benefited from the secrecy surrounding their internal functioning, and their "surprise" tactics help them maintain an atmosphere of intimidation. Their defenders claim the mutawiyin follow a prece dent in the strictest school of Sunni sharia, identified with the 9th-century jurist Ahmad ibn Hanbal, whose followers organized patrols for "prevention of sin." But such patrols remained a marginal phenomenon in Islamic history, often condemned, until the emergence of the Saudi state in the 20th century. The Mutawiyin in Court On July 1, three Saudi judges began a court inquiry into the death last month of a Saudi citizen, Ahmed Al-Bulawi, 50, who had been detained by the mutawiyin in the northwestern town of Tabuk. On July 2, however, four members of the religious militia accused of responsibility for the death, and whose trial had already been postponed once, were released on bail; the previous Friday, mosques in Tabuk had broadcast sermons calling on local Muslims to defend the accused. Al-Bulawi's case represents a microcosm of the mutawiyin's history. His alleged crime consisted of inviting a Moroccan woman who was not his relative and was unchaperoned by another male into his car. His relatives demand that those who caused his death be executed. Local authorities claim that Al-Bulawi died of natural causes, although the lawyer for his family told the media that the victim's remains showed he had been beaten in the face and head. The official medical report has not been released. For what it's worth, the unnamed Moroccan woman has revealed that Al-Bulawi formerly worked as her driver. A little before Al-Bulawi's death, in May, Salman Al-Huraisi, aged 28, died in mutawiyin hands in Riyadh. His home had been raided by militia members looking for alcohol and drugs. The Saudi daily al-Watan (The Nation) reported on June 28 that a lawyer for Al-Huraisi's family had been denied access to a medical report on the fatality, but that Al-Huraisi had died after blows to the eye and head. Some 18 mutawiyin participated in the raid on Al-Huraisi's home, and one of them is now due for trial. Local authorities initially sought to absolve the mutawiyin in the case by throwing a blanket of equivocation over them. Representatives of the governor of Riyadh claimed that the as-yet-unidentified individual accused of the killing was not on patrol when the victim died. The pro-al-Qaeda media enterprise Al-Sahat (The Battlefields) praised this attempt to deflect blame from the mutawiyin as appropriately protecting the militia's status. But some Arabic media insist Al-Huraisi's assailant was a leader of the mutawiyin. As in the past, vagueness about how the mutawiyin operate enables their alleged misconduct. Finally, a 50-year-old Saudi woman known as Umm Faisal ("mother of Faisal"--her full name is undisclosed) has filed suit against the mutawiyin for an incident in 2003 when she, her daughter, and a foreign maid were verbally and physically harassed while waiting in a car for her two sons. The three women were charged with public immorality, in line with Wahhabi teaching that the presence of women in cars amounts to solicitation of prostitution. On July 3, the complaint of Umm Faisal became the first ever civil action in which a representative of the mutawiyin was summoned to court, although, again, the trial was postponed, this time until September. With all this, the kingdom is atwitter about the mutawiyin. It is proof of the entrenched totalitarianism of Saudi society that such small steps as the charging of four militia members for Al-Bulawi's death and the court appearance of a militia member in the Umm Faisal matter are seen by ordinary Saudis as significant developments, potentially heralding a new epoch in the kingdom's life. Naturally, the defenders of the Wahhabi order are intent on the mutawiyin's survival. Prince Nayef has publicly reaffirmed his support, though not loudly enough for Al-Sahat, which complains that the all-male Shura Council appointed by the king has failed to open more mutawiyin centers and authorize payment of members. The Shura Council seems to walk a fine line between popular disaffection with the mutawiyin and extremist pressure; it also rejected reform proposals that the mutawiyin wear uniforms and include female personnel. Predictably protective of the institution is the Wahhabi establishment. On June 21, the newspaper Al-Madina reported that the grand mufti had denounced "unfair" media criticism of the religious militia and called for repression of the critics. The grand mufti is a descendant of Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (1703-1792), originator of the Wahhabi sect. His position has been hereditary since the Al-Wahhab family contracted a permanent alliance with the Saud clan, who leave religious affairs to the Wahhabi offspring while keeping the reins of state power for themselves. Amid these investigations and declamations, other sporadic and confusing measures have been proposed to ameliorate public dissatisfaction with the mutawiyin. When the case of Al-Bulawi first came to light, it was announced that 380 members of the militia would be trained in "interpersonal skills," surely one of the most bizarre statements yet from the Saudi authorities. The mutawiyin further promised to create a review process for their members' practices. At the same time, however, they rejected questions about their activities put forward by Saudi human rights activists. Moreover, recent examples of outrageous behavior by the mutawiyin abound. At the beginning of June, a certain Fahd Al-Bishi of Riyadh complained to the media that the militia had crashed their vehicle into his family car and harassed him on his daughter's wedding day because they suspected his son of drinking or traveling in the company of women unrelated to him. In March, the mutawiyin burst into Prince Salman Hospital in Riyadh and fought with security personnel while ostensibly chasing a drug dealer. A few days before that, the mutawiyin had been taught a lesson in the restive Eastern Province, whose large Shia Muslim population is subject to continual discrimination. A patrol detained a man who was listening to music, a prime offense in Wahhabi eyes. After the individual was released, he returned with several friends and beat up the mutawiyin. Indeed, by early this year, criticism of the institution had become so frequent that the militia refrained from its usual practice of violently interrupting the Riyadh International Book Fair, which opened in February, to search for banned literature. Many Saudis saw this as another small, positive step by the circle around King Abdullah, who is at odds with Prince Nayef, and is widely believed to seek a break with the past. Throughout this chronicle one sees the contradictory symptoms of a deepening, as yet hidden crisis of the Saudi regime. The state defends the mutawiyin while promising change, but not too much change. People speak out more candidly, but a primitive institution like the mutawiyin continues to get away with shocking acts. Trials are promised, and begin, and then are put off, under the sinister gaze of Nayef. Precisely how events will unfold is impossible to foretell, but it is not too much to say that if the mutawiyin are ever finally held to answer for their long career of oppression, the entire Wahhabi establishment may begin to crumble. Stephen Schwartz is a frequent contributor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD. Irfan al-Alawi is a close observer of Saudi affairs based in the United Kingdom. |
The Justice
University President Jehuda Reinharz has a problem with
Islam. Given that Brandeis is the pride of America's Jewish
community, and I am a Muslim, one might expect me to condemn
Reinharz for supporting Israel and criticizing radical Muslims.
But Reinharz's problem with Islam is the opposite of what one
might imagine: He has shown himself to be soft on Islamists.
What's more, when attacked by a Muslim opponent of radical
Islamists (me), he has resorted to Muslim-baiting.
I wrote an op-ed in the New York Post last January criticizing
Brandeis for hiring Natana DeLong-Bas to lecture on Islamic
studies. Soon after discussion began spreading in the United
States about Wahhabism and its link to the atrocities of 9/11,
DeLong-Bas emerged as a leading defender of the Wahhabi sect.
In Wahhabi Islam, DeLong-Bas's polemic on behalf of the Wahhabis
and their Saudi patrons, she acknowledged financial support for
her research from Fahd as-Semmari, director of the King Abd
al-Aziz Foundation for Research and Archives. She even told the
leading Arabic daily, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: "I know of no
convincing evidence that Osama bin Laden was responsible for the
attacks on the World Trade Center. All we know about him is that
he praised and commended those who did it. Radicals in Saudi
Arabia are not influenced by Islam, as so many people think. ...
The main factors are political: the Palestinian problem, … Iraq
… and U.S. support for Israel."
I criticized DeLong-Bas for her presentation of Wahhabism-the
most intolerant and violent fundamentalist interpretation of
Sunnism in recent history-as benevolent, peaceful, respectful of
other religion, and even feminist. A number of Brandeis
supporters expressed their shock and concern to President
Reinharz about the hiring of DeLong-Bas.
In response to critical letters, Reinharz sent a form reply that
included this statement about me: "Mr. Schwartz also identifies
himself as Suleyman Ahmad, a member of Jews for Allah. He writes
under both names, depending on his audience."
Reinharz's message is that as a Muslim critical of Islamist
ideology, I should not be trusted. But who better than a Muslim
can judge the Islamist discourse? In his view DeLong-Bas, who
serves as an advocate for the most backward elements of the
Saudi order-the Wahhabi clerics-is above reproach, even though
Reinharz admitted in his letter that he had not read her book.
Let me clarify some points. I am not Jewish by birth (my father
was Jewish but my mother was Christian), and I had no Jewish
upbringing. I had no religion before becoming Muslim; further, I
have never been a "member of Jews for Allah." I have a Muslim
name, Suleyman Ahmad Schwartz, but use it infrequently in
public, since I am established as an author and journalist under
my born name.
I serve as the executive director of the Center for Islamic
Pluralism. In addition, my 2002 book, The Two Faces of Islam,
was the first study that exposed in detail the Wahhabi sect of
Sunni Islam, its links to the Saudi monarchy and its role as the
inspirer of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida.
Reinharz's intent was multi-prejudicial: to dismiss my
opposition to the views of DeLong-Bas by profiling me as a
Muslim while implying that I am an apostate from Judaism. This
private and unethical disparagement of a public and legitimate
inquiry tries to replace a serious effort to assess the issues
present in the employment of a Wahhabi apologist with an attack
on my religious adherence.
A Brandeis president who denigrates a Muslim opponent of
extremism and defends a proponent of Wahhabism is dangerously
ignorant of today's internal conflicts in the community of
Muhammad and is in no position to contribute positively to the
defeat of Islamist terrorism and the survival of global
civilization.
The struggle against al-Qaida and its supporters will not be won
by flattering the academic accomplices of Saudi extremism. It
will be won, however, when Americans of all faiths learn that
moderate, anti-extremist Muslims are trustworthy and critical
allies.
The writer is executive director of the Center for Islamic
Pluralism (islamicpluralism.org). He writes for Campus Watch, a
project of the Middle East Forum.
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Copyright © 2008 IslamicPluralism.org
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