Radical Islam in Europe

ARE TERRORISTS EXPANDING THEIR RECRUITING EFFORTS?

The recent spate of foiled terrorist plots by Muslim extremists in Great Britain, Germany and Denmark is a grim reminder that radical Islam continues to pose a serious threat in Europe. Some experts warn that Europe could export its brand of terrorism to the United States, since many of Europe’s 15 million Muslims carry European passports that give them easy access to this country. European capitals like London have provided a haven for terrorists to organize, some critics say, because countries like Britain have failed to integrate Muslims into mainstream society. But other experts blame international terrorist networks, which recruit from a small minority of estranged European Muslims. Others argue that in fighting terrorism at home, countries like France have gone too far in curbing Muslims’ civil liberties. Concerned that their secular Western values are under threat from conservative Muslims, some European countries are considering limiting immigration and requiring new citizens to adopt the national language and beliefs.

A Jeep burns after terrorists drove the flaming vehicle into an airport terminal in Glasgow, Scotland, on June 30, 2007. Three physicians from Iraq, Jordan and India were among those charged in connection with the attack and an attempted car bombing in London a day earlier. An Indian engineer died from burns after his arrest.
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Radical Islam in Europe

THE ISSUES

A recent spate of attempted terrorist plots by Muslims in Europe has revived questions about how much of the threat is homegrown — the outgrowth of disaffection among European Muslims — and how much is orchestrated abroad.

On Sept. 4 German authorities announced they had foiled a plan to blow up an American military base in Frankfurt. Their arrest of a member of Germany’s large Turkish community — long considered one of Europe’s most peaceful Muslim immigrant groups — along with two German-born converts to Islam raised new questions about Germany as a locus of radicalization and its success at integrating Muslim residents.

Police said the planned explosion could have been more deadly than the 2004 train bombings in Madrid, which killed 191 people, and the 2005 London transit attack that killed 52 commuters. ¹

On the same day as the announcement of the German arrests, Muslims in Copenhagen were charged with planning a bombing attack in Denmark, suggesting that domestic discontent in the country — where Muslim immigrants complain of job discrimination and a newspaper triggered worldwide protests among Muslims two years ago by publishing cartoons seen as ridiculing Mohammed — may have provided fertile ground for Islamic terrorism. ²

This past summer, Britons were shocked to learn that Muslims suspected of trying to blow up the Glasgow, Scotland, airport on June 30 included middle-class Indian and Middle Eastern doctors working for the National Health Service — not alienated youths without jobs. The news came the day after the same suspects had allegedly tried to set off a car bomb outside a London nightclub and just before the anniversary of the July 7, 2005, London transit bombings. One of the suicide bombers from that attack had left a video in a strong Yorkshire accent — a startling reminder that “a British lad” had been radicalized at home even if he also had links to militants abroad. ³

All three events spurred soul-searching in Britain, Germany, Denmark, Scotland and elsewhere. Experts often blame Western foreign policies, including the war in Iraq, for the young Muslims’ outrage and their feeling that the Muslim world is under attack by the West. But the long-held belief by some European leaders that opposing the Iraq War would immunize their countries from Muslim terrorist attacks appeared dashed by the plot in Germany, which opposed the war. Authorities said the bombing scheme was linked to Germany’s military presence in Afghanistan. ⁴

To what extent does the violence that Europe is experiencing reflect a failure to integrate immigrants and their children into Western society?

“There is a sense in our societies that the radicalism was not created by the United States [foreign policy] but caused by the lack of integration,” Christoph Bertram, the former director of the Institute of Security Affairs in Berlin, told The New York Times the week after the German and Danish arrests.” ⁵

Reflecting that concern, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in July announced that in addition to beefing up border police he was proposing a fourfold increase in “hearts and minds” programs like citizenship classes in Britain’s 1,000 madrasas (Islamic religious schools, usually attached to a mosque), and English-language training for imams.

“A tough security response is vital, but to be safe in the longer term we need to reach people before they are drawn into violent extremism,” said Hazel Blears, Britain’s Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. ⁶

Other analysts argue that radical fundamentalism originates from increasingly well-organized international networks seeking out and finding the few estranged individuals ready to commit violence. The German and Danish plotters were said to have received training and instructions in Pakistan. And in September, European authorities warned that a newly strengthened al Qaeda,
operating from the lawless, tribal border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was stepping up plans to target Europe and the United States. 7 

Meanwhile, a recent New York City Police Department (NYPD) intelligence report concluded that the terrorists involved in the 2004 Madrid bombings, the London transit attack and the group in Hamburg, Germany, that planned the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States were “unremarkable” local residents, some with advanced degrees from European universities. Moreover, the report said, the process of radicalization seems to be accelerating, and terrorists are getting younger. “We now believe it is critical to identify the al Qaeda-inspired threat at the point where radicalization begins,” the report said, a conclusion shared by a 2006 British intelligence report. 8 

Jytte Klausen, a professor of comparative politics at Brandeis University who has studied the profiles of 550 alleged terrorists arrested since the 9/11 attacks, disputes the idea that terrorism is primarily the fruit of “homegrown” radicals who have not been integrated into society. “This is not primarily about integration, though better integration might be preventative,” she says. “It has a lot to do with transnational networks and ethnic origins: Political developments in Pakistan are getting filtered through Britain’s back door; the radical groups piggyback on the migrant stream.” 

British writer Ed Husain describes his recruitment in the 1990s in London by Islamists — Muslims who advocate an Islamic state, in some cases by violent means — in his 2007 memoir The Islamist. Husain argues that two factors prompt those drawn to political Islamic ideology to contemplate violence: the scorn heaped on non-Muslims by radical fundamentalists and the growing conviction that the world’s Muslims need their own transnational state — or caliphate — governed by strict religious law, called sharia.

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**More European Muslims Favor Suicide Bombings**

Muslims in France, Spain and Great Britain are twice as likely as American Muslims to condone suicide bombings of civilians. About one in six Muslims in the three countries say bombing civilians to defend Islam is justifiable.

*Can the suicide bombing of civilians to defend Islam be justified?*

**Muslims who said yes in . . .**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

But others, like sociologist Tahir Abbas of England’s University of Birmingham, say the notion of a Muslim caliphate is still an abstract one — an aspiration that isn’t much different from European nations joining together in the European Union. And some of the London organizations where Husain says he was radicalized, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and the controversial East London Mosque, claim they do not advocate violence to achieve the goal of a global Islamic state. Some groups say they only advocate the return of an Islamic state in Muslim countries. For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir says it works to bring “the Muslim world” under the caliphate but that in the West it does “not work to change the system of government.” (See sidebar, p. 282)

Some Muslim leaders in Britain, including Syed Aziz Pasha, secretary general of the Union of Muslim Organizations of the UK and Ireland, have pushed for sharia law in Britain — but only as it pertains to family matters like marriage, and only for Muslims. One poll shows about a third of British Muslims would rather live under sharia in the European Union in 2006, not counting the 70 million Muslims in Turkey. 

One measure of European Muslims’ alienation from Western governments and news sources is the surprisingly large majorities who don’t accept that recent terrorist acts were carried out by Muslims. An astonishing 56 percent of British Muslims don’t believe Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks, according to a poll by the Pew Research Center, a result commonly explained as acceptance of one of the conspiracy theories blaming Jews, Israel’s secret police or the Bush administration. But Abbas, who is Muslim himself, suggests another explanation for the widespread skepticism: Most Muslims are in denial because they are so shocked at the thought that fellow Muslims could carry out such a violent act. Experts on Islam also hasten to point out that sympathizing with suicide bombers or sharing fundamentalist beliefs doesn’t mean one will become a terrorist. Some of the fear about the call for an Islamic state by groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir — a group that calls for the end of Israel and which Britain has considered banning — is misplaced, Abbas believes. “People look at the surface, see dogma and . . . see it as a menacing threat. Yes, lots of people are hotheaded and mad, but they dip in and out of these organizations just as often as they’re sprouting up. Young people need to find themselves, need to search for meaning to their lives,” he says.

Yet, even if a group doesn’t advocate terrorism to achieve an Islamic state, parties advocating Islamic rule through peaceful means should also be resisted because they aim to establish a “totalitarian” theocracy, argues Martin Bright, a journalist who has investigated radical links to Muslim groups in Britain. “We make a mistake if we think that just because people are engaged in the electoral process that’s necessarily a good thing; Mussolini and Hitler were also engaged in the electoral process,” says Bright, political editor at the New Statesman, a left-leaning po-

### Jobs Are Top Muslim Concern

Most Muslims in Europe worry more about unemployment than about religious and cultural issues, such as the rise of extremism and the decline of religion. They are least concerned about the role of women in modern society.

### Percentage of Muslims very worried about . . .

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic extremism</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline of religion</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of pop culture</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern roles for women</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A majority of European Muslims consider their Islamic identity more important than their national identity (top). Christians in the same countries, however, say citizenship comes first (bottom).

**What do you consider yourself first?**

*Source: “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 2006*
Has Europe’s terrorism been caused by a failure to integrate Muslims into society?

In the early 1990s, the isolation of the Bangladeshi neighborhood in East London where writer Husain grew up made it relatively easy for radical Islamist groups to recruit him to their vision of a transnational Islamic state, he writes in his memoir.

The lack of contact with mainstream British culture and society helps explain why many young Muslims insist that the recent attack on the Glasgow airport and 9/11 itself must be the creation of the government and the media, Husain believes. “When you’re in that world, what others say [has] no meaning,” he says. “You see them as non-believers headed for hell anyway.”

But integration is a two-way street, and Husain says the traditional coldness of the English toward outsiders makes it difficult for anyone to easily enter their society.

Supporting that view is a Financial Times poll conducted last August that found Britons are more suspicious of Muslims than are other Europeans or Americans. Only 59 percent of Britons thought it possible to be both a Muslim and a citizen of their country, a smaller proportion than in France, Germany, Spain, Italy or the United States. British citizens also were the most likely to think a major terrorist attack was likely in their country in the next 12 months, to consider Muslims a threat to national security and to believe Muslims had too much political power in their country. 20

French immigration historian Patrick Weil, a senior research fellow at the University of Paris’ National Center for Scientific Research, says France accepts Muslims as fellow citizens and friends more easily than the British. “The English have fought work and educational discrimination among the elite, and they’ve been quite successful, but they’ve been bad at cultural integration,” he says. In France, it’s the opposite: “We’re very bad at ending discrimination but much better at integration.”

Among the Europeans polled, the French are the most likely to have Muslim friends, accept a son or daughter marrying a Muslim and think Muslims are unjustly the subject of prejudice. 21

In the same vein, more French Muslims think of themselves as French first and Muslim second than in the other three countries polled, according to a Pew survey. 22 (See graph, p. 270.)

That may help explain why France has been spared a major Muslim terrorist attack since the mid-1990s. The 2005 riots in Paris’ poorer, heavily Muslim suburbs were protests against racial and economic discrimination driven by a desire to be part of France, rather than a separatist Muslim movement, Weil and other experts believe. Even when Muslims were protesting France’s 2004 headscarf ban in public schools, their chant was decidedly Francophile: “First, Second, Third Generation: We don’t give a damn: Our home is Here!” 23

Weil, a member of a commission appointed in 2003 by former French President Jacques Chirac that recommended banning “conspicuous religious symbols” in schools, claims the headscarf ban has helped to integrate Muslims into France’s secular system and has given Muslim girls a better chance at educational equality.
he points out the ban was implemented without the need for police enforcement. The Koran became a bestseller during the head-scarf debate, a sign that non-Muslims wanted to learn more about Islam, he says. The head-scarf rule “includes you in the system” of basic French values, he says.

But John R. Bowen, an anthropologist at Washington University in St. Louis and author of Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves, thinks the ban incurred resentment in the Muslim community. Nevertheless, he argues in a recent article, Muslims and non-Muslims in France “are far more willing to get on with the task of building a multireligious society than are the Dutch, British or Spanish — or even Americans.”

French Muslims, for instance, are not calling for sharia law, as do many British Muslims, he notes. Partly that’s historical: Many North Africans arrive speaking fluent French and have a sense of affiliation to their former colonial power. Most French Muslims also tend to live in more ethnically mixed areas, while in England entire Bangladeshi villages seem to have been plopped down in single neighborhoods.

Most experts also give credit to the French police and domestic intelligence service. “The French really monitor their Muslims closely, so if someone is preaching a radical sermon they’ll know right away and have much less compunction than the British to say, ‘You can’t do that,’ or find a way to get rid of the guy” by deporting him, says Bowen.

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**Foreign Domination Sparked Radical Islamic Thought**

*Muslim writers protested British, U.S. interventions.*

The radicalization of Islam has historic roots reaching back to the 1930s, '40s and '50s, when Muslim writers were also protesting colonialism and what they saw as imperialistic British and U.S. interventions in the Middle East.

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, sought to couple resistance to foreign domination with establishment of an Islamic state run by sharia law, which imposes strict interpretations of the Koran. The Brotherhood at first worked closely with the secret Free Officers revolutionary movement led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat, which aimed at overthrowing the British regime and the Egyptian royal family.

But after the group’s military coup toppled the Egyptian monarchy in 1952, Nasser’s regime sorely disappointed the Brotherhood as insufficiently Islamic. A failed assassination attempt on Nasser by an embittered Brotherhood member in 1954 prompted the secular government to brutally suppress the movement and imprison its leaders.

One of those imprisoned leaders was Sayyid Qutb, known by his followers as “The Martyr,” whose anti-Western writings would become extremely influential in the jihadist movement. In 1948, while on a study mission to the United States, he wrote with distaste of the sexual permissiveness and consumerism he saw, comparing the typical American to a primitive “caveman.” Aliensed by America’s hedonism, he argued the only way to protect the Islamic world from such influences would be to return to strict Islamic teachings.

Qutb spent most of the last decade of his life imprisoned in Egypt, where he was tortured. While in prison he wrote Milestones, his famous work espousing his vision of Islam as inseparable from the political state, and concluded the regime was a legitimate target of jihad. He was convicted of sedition in 1966 and hanged.

The ideas of writers like Qutb have been adopted by radical Islamic groups (Islamists) today, generating concern in the West. An updated version of Milestones, published in Birmingham, England, in 2006 and prominently displayed at the bookstore next to the controversial East London Mosque contains a 1940s-era instruction manual by another member of the Muslim Brotherhood with chapter headings like “The Virtues of Killing a Non-Believer for the Sake of Allah” and “The Virtues of Martyrdom.”

The Muslim Brotherhood was “really the first organization to develop the idea that you could have an Islamic state within the modern world,” according to New Statesman political editor Martin Bright.

Although the Brotherhood is sometimes represented as moderate in comparison to jihadist groups like al Qaeda, Bright notes its motto remains to this day: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our Leader. The Qu’uran [Koran] is our constitution. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.” In 1981, Sadat, who had become Egypt’s president, was assassinated by four members of a Brotherhood splinter group.

Robert S. Leiken, director of the Immigration and National Security Program at the Nixon Center in Washington, D.C., recently interviewed leaders of the Brotherhood in Europe and the Middle East. He concluded the organization “depends on winning hearts through gradual and peaceful Islamization” and is committed to the electoral process. However, the group does authorize jihad in countries it considers occupied by a foreign power.

For instance, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Brotherhood’s spiritual leader, has supported suicide bombing in the Palestinian occupied territories and called it a duty of every Muslim to resist American and British forces in Iraq.

Jamaat-e-Islami, the radical Asian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, originated in British India first as a religious movement in 1941 and then as a political party committed to an Islamic state in 1947. It is the oldest religious party in Pakistan and also has wings in Bangladesh and Kashmir.
The party was founded by Abdul A’la Maududi, a Pakistani journalist who promoted a highly politicized, anti-Western brand of Islam. In his writings, Maududi asserts that Islamic democracy is the antithesis of secular Western democracy because the latter is based on the sovereignty of the people, rather than God.

Maududi was the first Muslim to reject Islam as a religion and re-brand it as an ideology — political Islam. His writing strongly influenced Qutb during his years in prison. British former radical Ed Husain writes that the organizations in London where he first heard Islam described as a political ideology in the 1990s — the Young Muslim Organization and the East London Mosque — both venerated Maududi.8

But while Maududi urged gradual change through a takeover of political institutions, Qutb argued for “religious war,” seizing political authority “wherever an Islamic community exists,” and jihadi “to make this system of life dominant in the world.”9

In support, Qutb cited the Prophet Mohammed’s declaration of war on the infidels of Mecca. Qutb tarred all Christian, Jewish and Muslim societies of his time as ḫābilī — disregarding divine precepts — because their leaders usurped Allah’s legislative authority. “When I read Milestones, I felt growing animosity toward the ḫīfar (non-Muslims),” Husain writes.10

Husain would eventually move on to an even more radical group, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Palestinian theologian and political activist Taqjuddin an-Nabhani. While Qutb and Maududi argued that Muslims had a religious duty to establish an Islamic state, Nabhani “provided the details of how to achieve it,” writes Husain — through military coups or assassinations of political leaders.11

Today, Hizb ut-Tahrir says it seeks to establish a caliphate, or Islamic state governing all Muslims, through an “exclusive” political” rather than violent method.12 However, the group was recently denounced by a former senior member, Maajid Nawaz, who told the BBC that according to the group’s own literature, the caliphate is “a state that they are prepared to kill millions of people to expand.”13

Today, reverence for the writings of Qutb or Maududi should be a litmus test for any Islamist group’s level of radicalism, according to Husain. But University of Birmingham sociologist Tahir Abbas cautions that Maududi’s writing “is about trying to fight off the yoke of colonialism as much as developing a pan-Islamic identity. When it comes to Maududi, he’s writing for his time — and people take it out of context.”

Indeed, to the uninitiated, the writings of both Qutb and Maududi come across as rather dry, if fiercely loyal, interpretations of the Koran as the supreme word.

Still, Maududi’s party, Jamaat-e-Islami, has spawned its share of leaders preaching violent hatred against the West. Hossain Sayeddi, a Jamaat-e-Islami member of the Bangladesh Parliament, has compared Hindus to excrement. In public rallies in Bangladesh, he has urged that unless they convert to Islam, “let all the American soldiers be buried in the soil of Iraq and let them never return to their homes.”14

Surprisingly, a French government adviser on religious affairs, Bernard Godard, who specialized in Muslim neighborhoods while serving with the French police and domestic intelligence service, ascribes France’s lack of Muslim terrorism not to the country’s policing efforts but to its policy of non-engagement in Iraq. “France is a little country that is not considered dangerous,” he says. And it is harder to recruit North African Muslims for terrorism than Middle Easterners, he suggests. “They have no reason to do something against France.”

The French also are more much more inclusive toward newcomers than their neighbors. The French government gives newly arrived immigrants hundreds of hours of free French-language lessons to help qualify them for employment. In contrast, observes Bowen, the Netherlands recently required would-be immigrants — even the spouses of Dutch residents — to prove that they already speak good Dutch before they arrive, but provide no help in learning the language. “The Dutch are using language to exclude Muslims, the French to integrate them,” he says.25

Similarly, Germany recently proposed requiring that immigrants show on their naturalization applications that they agree with German public opinion — a tactic some have called the policing of “un-German” thought. Turks and other Muslims see the plan as discriminatory, according to a study by the International Crisis Group (ICG). Nevertheless,
the report concluded that Germany’s approach to its mainly Turkish Muslim population was “paying off” — judging from the lack of terrorist incidents or riots in Germany compared to the experiences of Britain and France. 26 (The ICG report was issued before the recent foiled German plot.)

But Boston College political scientist Jonathan Laurence, the author of the ICG report on Germany and a book published last year on integration in France, says the recent German plot involving a Turkish resident doesn’t change his “cautious optimism.” 27

Since Germany has traditionally treated Turkish immigrants as “guestworkers” rather than citizens, most of today’s Turkish population still holds only Turkish citizenship even though half were born in Germany. A 2000 law opened the door to citizenship but under very restrictive rules. Laurence says German Turks have less “political frustration” than Muslims in other European countries because they have lower expectations as a result of German citizenship laws. “They don’t feel as entitled to success or mobility because they have not been included in the German dream,” he says.

But he doubts that there are “any direct causal links” between a lack of integration and recent terrorist attempts in Europe. “There are too many other poorly integrated groups that don’t turn to terror,” he says.

If failure to integrate were the cause, “We’d have masses of people joining the jihad, which is not happening,” says Jocelyne Cesari, director of Harvard University’s Paris-based Islam in the West study group and author of the 2004 book When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States.

In fact, she continues, “All national ideologies in Europe are in crisis,” as indicated by France’s failure to ratify the EU constitution. 28 And for some young people, Islamic ideologies fill the vacuum left by national identity, she says.

That’s what has happened in Britain, argues British Daily Mail journalist Melanie Phillips in her book Londonistan. England has become the epicenter of Islamic terrorism, she argues, in part because of shame about British national identity. “British society presented a moral and philosophical vacuum that was ripe for colonization by predatory Islamism,” she writes. 29 “Driven by postcolonial guilt . . . Britain’s elites have come to believe that the country’s identity and values are by definition racist, nationalist and discriminatory.” 30

Ironically, points out Brandeis political scientist Klausen, England has the most terrorism in Europe even though it is one of Europe’s most integrated countries by measures like education. The young Islamist radicals described in Hussein’s memoir are all middle class and well integrated, she points out, including Hussein, who worked in a bank. “We have a movement of radical groups recruiting among middle-class, upwardly mobile young Muslims,” she says.

Klausen blames England’s terrorism on international political networks and a generational counterculture that has found violence-prone individuals. In her study of four Danish-born Muslim teenagers convicted in connection with an October 2005 plot to blow up the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo, she found many similarities to the shooters at Colorado’s Columbine High School in 1999. In her ongoing study of 550 people arrested for terrorism since 9/11, she was surprised to find a high degree of petty-criminal histories, suggesting these are not mainstream Muslims. And a highly traditional, religious background does not seem to be a predictor either. “The argument that democracy is illegitimate is what turns them on,” she says.

Although unemployment is high among young Muslim men in Britain, it isn’t among terrorists arrested there, according to Klausen, suggesting only a tenuous link between inequality or discrimination and political anger. 31

So is terrorism the result of a lack of integration or the influence of external terrorist networks? “It’s both,” according to Robert S. Leiken, director of the Immigration and National Security Program at the Nixon Center, a think tank in Washington, D.C. Europe, he says, currently has two kinds of jihadists: “outsiders” — typically radical imams, asylum seekers or students fleeing from crackdowns against Islamist agitators in the Middle East — and “insiders” — second- or third-generation children of immigrants. 32

“That’s why Britain is the most dangerous country,” according to Leiken. “It has the confluence of these two sources of jihad.”

Europe Has Many Low-Income Muslims

Approximately one-fifth of Muslims in Europe are considered low-income, leading some terrorism experts to conclude that economic deprivation triggers extremism. In the United States, where there have been few terrorist attacks, only 2 percent of Muslims are considered low-income.

Percentage of Muslims Considered Low-income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Has Britain’s multiculturalism fostered social isolation and extremism?

Various books, columns and think-tank reports recently have blamed Britain’s multicultural ethos for creating segregation along religious lines and, in some eyes, providing fertile ground for extremist Islamic ideas. Last year Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly launched a study commission to examine whether multiculturalism was causing greater ethnic-minority separateness. 33

By the time the commission reported back in June, the term “multiculturalism” had disappeared from the report in favor of a new buzzword, “community cohesion,” which some columnists took as a reflection of the government’s growing anxiety about its earlier approach. 34

Some critics say multiculturalism encourages Britons to elevate Islamic values over British values. Schools have ceased to transmit either the values or the story of the nation because in a multicultural classroom, the “majoritarian culture is viewed as illegitimate and a source of shame,” writes Phillips in Londonistan. 35

In that vacuum, it’s easy for Islamic radicalism to step in, some argue. For instance, in the state school Husain attended in Britain, Muslim children attended separate assemblies managed by a front organization for the revolutionary Islamic movement Jamaat-e-Islami. It then administered tests promoting Islam as an ideology that sought political power. 36

The debate over British schools’ abdication of responsibility for teaching about Islam is strikingly different from the debate in the United States, where the struggle has usually been over whether officially authorized textbooks or curricula should give more prominence to the nation’s traditionally ignored ethnic

groups. Compared to Canada, where multiculturalism is a curriculum taught from kindergarten, the term in Britain is “a bit murky,” creating a “confused debate,” says Canadian-born Abdul-Rehman Malik, a contributing editor at Q-Neus, an edgy magazine aimed at young British Muslim professionals.

To some critics, multiculturalism means the funding of local religious groups, which the critics blame for increasing tensions between Muslims and people of other faiths. A report issued this year by Policy Exchange, a conservative London think tank, concludes that the growth of radical Muslim politics has been “strongly nurtured by multicultural policies at the local and national level since the 1980s.” 37

Muslims’ focus on religious identity and their sense that they are victims of discrimination “feeds into the broader narrative of victimhood that radical Islam in Britain is all about,” says lead author Munira Mirza. “A lot of radical Islam in Britain is about saying, ‘We Muslims are under attack; the West is against us.’ ”

Yet aside from legislation outlawing discrimination, which has been broadened to include religious discrimination, it’s hard to point to any one government policy that’s explicitly multicultural, says Sarah Spencer, associate director at the University of Oxford’s Centre on Migration, Policy and Society and former deputy chairwoman of the government’s Commission for Racial Equality.

Rather than multiculturalism causing the separation, “the factors that promote separation are socioeconomic ones,” she maintains, such as housing clustered in poor neighborhoods.

Nevertheless, some critics argue that multiculturalism pervades both the public and private sectors in myriad ways, sometimes by just leaving Muslim communities alone.

The London-based Centre for Social Cohesion recently reported that the Islamic sections in public libraries in Tower Hamlets, London’s most heavily Muslim borough, were dominated by fundamentalist literature — preaching terrorism and violence against women and non-Muslims. 38 This is a prime example of taxpayer-funded multicultural policy promoting radical Islam, according to center director Douglas Murray. A Muslim seeking to learn more about his faith from the library “couldn’t help but be pushed toward the more extreme interpretation,” he says.

The “most horrifying example” of letting-alone multiculturalism, says Murray, is the estimated dozen Muslim women who are murdered in Britain each year in “honor killings” by fathers and brothers. An independent commission is investigating how police handled the case of a 20-year-old Kurdish woman killed by her father after she repeatedly sought help from authorities.

Police “may be worried that they will be seen as racist if they interfere in another culture,” said Diana Sammi, director of the Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Rights Organization. 39

Women’s advocates have sought legislation to protect women from forced marriages — already outlawed in Norway and Denmark — which they see as strongly linked to honor killings (see p. 286). But University of Chicago anthropologist Richard Schweder cautions it’s not clear that honor killings in the Muslim community occur with more frequency than passion killings of adulterous partners by Western husbands. Other experts suggest that police may have failed to follow through on these cases for other reasons, perhaps having more to do with their own racism or their attitudes towards domestic violence.

Leiken of the Nixon Center says Britain’s “separatist form of multiculturalism” offered radical Islamists from Algeria and other Muslim countries refuge and the opportunity to preach openly during the 1990s at a time when the French government was denying asylum to radical Muslims. 40 Britain’s multicultural ideology “meant the legal system was lenient, and police often found themselves in a situation where

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4 Multiculturalism is often described as the idea that all races, religions and ethnicities should be equally valued and respected.
they couldn’t do anything” when moderate Muslims complained about radical clerics taking over their mosques, Leiken says.

Outspoken multiculturalism critic Kenan Malik, an Indian-born writer and lecturer living in London, complains government leaders were “subcontracting out” their relationship with Muslim citizens by dealing almost exclusively with clerics or official groups like the British Muslim Council, which has been accused of having radical links. And in a report published last year, journalist Bright criticized government officials for championing a group that promotes “a highly politicised version of Islam.” 41

“Why should British citizens who happen to be Muslim rely on clerics?” Malik asks. “It encourages Muslims to see themselves as semi-detached Britons.”

Many French experts tend to agree the British laissez faire approach to multiculturalism failed because the government “created a higher identification with the [religious] group and left all authority with the religious leaders,” in the words of Riva Kastoryano, a senior research fellow at the University of Paris’ National Center for Scientific Research, who has written a book on multiculturalism in Europe.

Indeed, when it comes to local government funding, Malik said, “multiculturalism has helped to segregate communities far more effectively than racism.” 42

For example, during the 2005 Birmingham riots in Britain, blacks and Asians turned against one another. But 20 years earlier, black and Asian youths had joined together in riots there to protest police harassment and poverty. What changed, according to Malik, was the local government’s “multicultural response” — setting up consultation groups and allocating funding along faith lines.

“Different groups started fighting one another for funding, and the friction led to the riots between the two communities” in 2005, he says.

Would cracking down on terrorism violate civil liberties?

After the most recent foiled bombing plots in Britain, the Labor government proposed extending from 28 days to up to 56 days the period police can hold terrorist suspects without charge — a proposal opposed by both the Conservative and the Liberal Democratic parties.

The government says plots have become so complicated that police need more time to investigate. According to British police, big terrorism cases against one or two suspects can involve the investigation of 200 phones, 400 computers, 8,000 CDs, 6,000 gigabytes of data and 70 premises across three continents. 43

In unveiling his anti-terror measures, Prime Minister Gordon Brown anticipated resistance from Parliament, which two years earlier had ratcheted down Blair’s 90-day detention proposal to 28 days — a doubling of the then-14-day detention period.

“Liberty is the first and founding value of our country,” Brown said. “Security is the first duty of our government.” 44

But Human Rights Watch says the extension would violate human rights law. The proposed 28 days is still more than twice as much as any other European country, and the government now releases more than half those accused in terrorism cases without charge, the group points out. 45

Longer detentions would “clearly discriminate” against Muslim communities and be “counterproductive in making Muslims willing to cooperate with police” because they arouse such resentment, says Ben Ward, associate director for Europe and Central Asia at Human Rights Watch in London. Polls show that more than half of British Muslims already lack confidence in the police, he says. Muslim groups like the Muslim Council of Britain oppose the extension on similar grounds.

Allowing telephone wiretap evidence in court — another change being considered by the government —

Continued on p. 278
Chronology

19th Century
European nations colonize much of Muslim world. British colonization of India sparks mass Muslim immigration to Europe by end of century.

1900-1960s
European rule in Islamic world ends. Muslims establish their own states. . . . Fundamentalist (Islamist) political groups emerge, some espousing a pan-Muslim caliphate. Muslim workers begin emigrating to Europe.

1928
Radical Muslim Brotherhood is founded in Egypt.

1941
Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party is founded in Pakistan.

1947-48
Pakistan becomes world’s first avowedly Islamist state. . . . Israel is established, displacing Palestinians and creating lasting conflict with Arabs, Muslims.

1952
Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser topples Egyptian monarchy.

1953
Radical Islamic party Hizb ut-Tahrir is founded in Jerusalem.

1954
Brotherhood member tries to assassinate Nasser, who then imprisons leaders, including Sayyid Qutb. Qutb writes Milestones — manifesto of political Islam.

1964
Milestones is published.

1970s
Movement for Islamic state advances; Europe limits immigration to families, causing more Muslim emigration.

1979
Iranian Revolution ousts U.S.-backed Reza Shah Pahlavi, brings Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini to power.

1980s
Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan and Iran seek to dominate Muslim world, send missionaries to Europe.

1981
Scarman Report blames racial discrimination for South London Brixton riots, calls for multicultural approach toward Muslims.

1986
French pass strong terrorist-detention laws after spate of bombings.

1987
Saudia millionaire Osama bin Laden forms al Qaeda terrorist network.

1989
Iran’s Khomeini calls for murder of Salmon Rushdie for his allegedly blasphemous depiction of Mohammed in The Satanic Verses.

1990s
Al Qaeda, other Islamist groups shift from national liberation to terrorism.

1995
Al Qaeda calls on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies.

2000s
Islamist terrorists target Europe.

Sept. 11, 2001
Terrorists attack World Trade Center and Pentagon.

December 2001
British Muslim Richard Reid tries to ignite “shoe bomb” aboard Paris-Miami flight.

2004

2005
London transit bombings kill 52. . . . Riots erupt in Muslim suburbs of Paris, other French cities.

2006
Danish cartoonist’s depictions of Mohammed provoke protests worldwide. . . . Group of 23 mostly British Muslims are arrested on Aug. 10 on suspicion of planning to blow up transatlantic planes. . . . On Sept. 1 Muslims are arrested for running a terrorist camp in Sussex, Britain. . . . Britain expands detention powers against suspected terrorists.

2007
Europe and U.S. reported to be targets of revived al Qaeda. . . . Eight Muslims charged in failed car bombings in London, Glasgow; Bombing plots foiled in Germany, Denmark. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown proposes longer detention for terror suspects; British government encourages expansion of Muslim schools. . . . Spanish court convicts 21 in connection with 2004 Madrid train bombing; clears 3 alleged leaders.
would be more effective in pursuing terrorist cases, says Ward. Britain is the only Western country that bans wire-tap evidence in criminal prosecutions, he says, because its security services oppose revealing their methods.

Of all the counterterrorism measures being proposed in Europe, Human Rights Watch is “most concerned” about the United Kingdom, says Ward. But when it comes to existing practice, many experts consider France the most draconian.

From September 2001 to September 2006, France deported more than 70 people it considers “Islamic fundamentalists,” including 15 Muslim imams, according to a recent Human Rights Watch report. 46

The advocacy group argues that deportations require a much lower standard of evidence than judicial prosecutions and violate human rights because they often expose deportees to torture in their home countries. “Our point is not that all these guys are completely innocent, but even if someone is guilty of involvement in terrorism, France has a duty to make sure they’re not sending them back to a place where they’re facing threat of torture” — a serious risk even for an innocent person returned home once he’s slapped with a terrorist label, says Judith Sunderland, author of the Human Rights Watch report on France’s deportations.

“When we talk to people in Muslim communities, there’s a lot of fear; they know they’re being watched, and they’re concerned about what they can say,” says Sunderland. “We spoke to imams who said anytime they say anything in defense of someone accused of terrorism, they know they will be on someone’s watch list.” This fear erodes Muslims’ trust in law enforcement and makes them less willing to cooperate in terrorism cases, she says.

But Godard, the adviser to the French Interior Ministry who has served as a specialist on Arab communities in both the national police and security services, dismisses her concerns. “Fifteen imams [removed] in 10 years — it’s nothing,” he says with a shrug.

Human Rights Watch is also concerned about France’s use of its “criminal conspiracy” charge, which it says requires a low standard of evidence. “People are being detained for up to two years on very flimsy evidence,” says Ward.

What Makes a Person ‘British’?

Stereotypical views are challenged.

At a North London pub, young professionals with pints in hand were engaged in a favorite national pastime — the Pub Quiz, a competition usually focused on trivia or sports.

But this quiz was different: It came from the test immigrants must take when applying for citizenship — popularly known as the “Britishness test.” The 24-question exam was introduced in 2005 after former Home Secretary David Blunkett insisted that new immigrants should have a command of the English language and understand the nature of British life, customs and culture.

Not one of the 100 (mostly British) volunteers passed, an announcement greeted with applause, hilarity and shouts of “Deported”!

Teams with ad hoc names — like “As British as a pint of Guinness” — competed to answer such questions as, How many members are in the United Kingdom population has used illegal drugs? The highest score was 17, by Rohan Thanotheran, a Sri Lanka-born accountant who has lived in England since 1962. 1

“Who would bother to learn those facts?” he asked later, suggesting the quiz was a desperate attempt by the government to reclaim nationalism at a time when symbols like the English flag are being hijacked by the far right.

Pub-goers are not the only British citizens who have failed. Member of Parliament Mike Gapes — who has supported the test, saying, “Nationalism is something that should be earned and not just given away” — flunked when 10 of the questions were posed to him during an interview. 2

The test has been criticized for lengthening the application process and promoting a “siege mentality” among Britons towards foreigners. 3

Many young people in the pub clearly found the questions comical, and several questioned the very idea of testing someone’s “Britishness.”

“The meaning of citizenship is not about knowing what percent of Christians in the U.K. are Catholics. Those are things most British citizens don’t know. It doesn’t make us any less British,” said Munira Mirza, a writer, graduate student and founding member of The Manifesto Club, which organized the event to challenge stereotypical views of identity and Britishness.

A slim 29-year-old with shoulder-length black hair, Mirza was born in England of Pakistani Muslim parents. She describes herself as British-Asian but is quick to add that such ethnic and religious labels are “increasingly irrelevant to people, especially of my age, who grow up here and don’t think of ourselves as ethnic categories.” For example, she resists requests from TV producers to present the Muslim point of view. “You know what they’re thinking: ‘Only Muslims can connect with other Muslims.’ It’s quite a close-minded view,” she says.

Two other quiz-takers from Muslim backgrounds in this distinctly secular crowd said they sometimes felt forced to identify with their parents’ foreign heritage because English peers persisted in seeing them as foreigners.
Lani Homeri, 26, a fashionably dressed law student with striking dark eyes and long raven hair, was born in Britain of Iraqi Kurdish parents who emigrated in the 1970s. She finds it odd how frequently she is asked whether she is Muslim, especially, she says, since she wears Western clothing and is “not a practicing Muslim.”

A 28-year-old male pub-goer born in Sweden of Iranian parents who had fled the Islamic revolution said hostile questions about Islam from native-born Britons often made him defensive. “I’m agnostic, but when people attack Islam, I start defending it, even though it messed up my country,” he said. “People like me, who want a secular government, start to protect their government because it’s attacked on stupid grounds.”

Misperceptions about Islam could help explain a recent poll conducted by Harris Interactive for the Financial Times, which found the British are more suspicious of Muslims than other Europeans or Americans. Only 59 per cent of Britons thought it possible to be both a Muslim and a citizen of their country, a smaller proportion than in France, Germany, Spain, Italy or the United States.

Although the poll was taken before the foiled attacks in London and Glasgow in June, the memory of previous attacks, like the 7/7 transit bombings of July 7, 2005, may have hardened British attitudes. British citizens were also the most likely to predict a major terrorist attack in their country in the next 12 months, to consider Muslims a threat to national security and to believe Muslims had too much political power in their country.

Mirza says those polls didn’t reflect her own experience living in Britain. But she blames a “multicultural ethos” for forcing people to increasingly identify themselves with a particular ethnic or religious community, whether it is students taught to identify with people of their own race in history class or community leaders jockeying with ethnic groups for government funding.

A report Mirza coauthored for the London think tank Policy Exchange blames the methods Britain uses to encourage multiculturalism — such as providing local funding that can only be claimed by groups defined by ethnic or religious identity — for nurturing a “culture of victimhood” among Muslims, laying the groundwork for young people to turn to Muslim political groups.

The rise of extremist groups is somewhat understandable “at a time when other political identities like ‘left’ and ‘right’ are not very appealing,” Mirza observes, noting that young people are also gravitating to other forms of extremism, such as violence in the name of animal rights.

“We should be winning these young people over to other ideas,” she says. “Unless you deal with that major problem, you will always find people will turn to something else that’s offering a vision.”

3 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
transit system the day before. The London Metropolitan police force was found guilty Nov. 1 of putting the public at risk during the bungled operation.

Unlike the IRA, Clarke says, today’s terrorism threat is global, with players willing to die who are quickly replaced. Networks re-form quickly, no warnings are given and weaponry (like fertilizer bombs) is unconventional, he says. 47 He cites the case of Dhiren Barot, an al Qaeda plotter who left plans on his laptop computer for killing thousands of people in Britain (and the United States) by detonating underground bombs.

After Barot’s arrest in 2004, British police had to “race against time” to retrieve enough evidence from the seized computers and other equipment to justify charges at the end of the permitted period of detention. 48 After that experience, the Terrorism Act of 2006 criminalized “acts preparatory to terrorism,” and police proposed extending the period terrorist suspects can be held without charge. 49

In addition, since 2001 British anti-terror laws have given the government — with public support — more leeway to mine databases for information about individuals. “There was an assumption that if it was necessary to hand over our privacy to the state to provide protection, that it was a price worth paying,” says Gareth Crossman, policy director at Liberty, a London-based civil liberties advocacy group. Now, the country has so many cameras trained on citizens “the government’s privacy watchdog describes England as ‘the surveillance society.’ ” 50

A recent Liberty report warns privacy could be invaded in the future because of the government’s ability to mine data and watch people on the street. Surveillance cameras, more prevalent in Britain than any other country, are credited with tracing autos involved in past terrorist attempts. But Liberty wants the government to regulate where they’re placed and how they’re operated (many are installed by private companies) to protect ordinary citizens’ privacy. 51

Legislation passed in Britain would authorize a national ID card, though it hasn’t been implemented and may never be because of the cost. But Grossman warns the government could use it to trawl through databases for personal information by profiling “the sort of person that might be involved in terrorist activity — purely on the basis of demographic information. It’s a real minefield. A young, Muslim male is basically where it will end up. That’s hugely sensitive.”

**BACKGROUND**

**Muslim Migration**

Modern Muslim immigration to Europe began in the late 19th century as a result of Europe’s colonial and trading activity, which largely explains the different ethnic groups in each country and to some extent their degree of acceptance by those societies. The French conquest of Algiers in 1830 eventually led to French control of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Together, British colonization of India (which included modern-day Pakistan and Bangladesh) and Dutch domination of trade in Asia gave the three European countries control over most of the world’s Muslims.

At the end of the 19th century, immigration began on a large scale, as France imported low-paid workers from Algeria and other African territories and other countries recruited workers from their colonies and territories. Following World War II, countries like England sought workers, including many Muslims, to help with reconstruction. By the 1960s, entire Muslim families had begun to settle in Europe.

By 1974, however, a global economic recession had led many countries to limit migration, allowing entry only for family reunification or political asylum. Paradoxically, the policy led to further immigration by families, the only means of entry. The recession also increased Europeans’ resentment of immigrants and their children, who were viewed as competing for jobs.

During the 1980s, Muslims’ religious identity became more pronounced as young Muslims — frustrated by job discrimination — turned to their religion as a source of identity. Islamic political movements in Iran, North Africa and South Asia also influenced this trend. The rise of political Islam encouraged Muslims in Europe to form associations based on religion, which heightened Europeans’ fears of Islam as growing numbers of Muslim refugees were arriving from wars in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Bosnia. At this time, as rivalry broke out between different groups in Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan and Iran for domination of Muslim ideology, Europe became a target of missionary and proselytizing efforts, helped along by the distribution of petrodollars — mainly from Saudi Arabia — to create mosques, Islamic schools and even university chairs. 52

Saudi money supported the spread and teaching of the Wahhabi strand of Islam, the official religion of Saudi Arabia and the guiding spiritual doctrine of al Qaeda. Wahhabism is a fundamentalist form of Islam that preaches strict adherence to Islam’s injunctions, including abiding by sharia law.

As Harvard’s Cesari explains, since Sept. 11 the apotolic nature of fundamentalist groups has been increasingly questioned as these groups have radicalized their rhetoric against non-Muslims and the West. These movements preach “a theology of intolerance” — referring to all non-Muslims as kuffir (or infidel) and aspects of modern life as haram (forbidden) — “which can easily become . . . a theology of hate,” she writes. Since the 1967 Israeli victory over the Arabs, a feeling of humiliation has combined with a warlike insistence on
Islam’s superiority over everything Western, democratic and secular.  

Individual acts of political terrorism in the 1990s and early 2000s fueled fears of radical Islam in Europe. Between 1995 and 1996, a radical Algerian group seeking an Islamic state in Algeria set off bombs on Paris subways and trains. And, prior to the 1998 World Cup soccer tournament in France, the French arrested 100 members of the group in a preventive action. Radical preachers in Paris and London began to attract young Muslims from the poorer suburbs and cities. Some went to fight in Afghanistan or Iraq, while a few committed terrorist acts at home.

Increased immigration from Muslim countries and high birthrates combined to make Islam the fastest-growing religion on the continent, even as ethnic and religious tensions grew. In October 2005 riots erupted in the Muslim suburbs of Paris and other French cities, with the participants complaining of joblessness and discrimination. Muslims also demonstrated against the proposed ban on Muslim girls wearing head scarves at school, which took effect in 2004.

The Madrid train bombings, the 2004 assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan and the 2005 London subway explosions — all committed by radical Muslims — led European countries to question how well they were integrating Muslim immigrants and their children.

Anthropologist Bowen attributes the differences in how Muslim communities have been absorbed and the types of politics they’ve adopted in various European countries to the different ways each country treated its colonies and immigrants from those colonies.

In France, Muslim immigrants are clustered in poor, outer suburbs that include a mix of North Africans — such as Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians — all of whom speak French and grew up under French rule. North Africans often arrived feeling that they were quasi-French citizens, even if they were second-class citizens, says Bowen.

But in Britain many Muslims live in ethnic enclaves in Bangladeshi or Pakistani neighborhoods where Bengali is spoken in stores and banks, and parents of London-born children often speak no English. As schools in these neighborhoods become 100 percent Asian, some educators are concerned the teaching of English as a first language is being thwarted.  

“Another interesting thing is that the French immigration story goes back to the beginning of the 20th century,” Bowen adds, “whereas in Britain the immigration is much more recent, and the communities are much more closed off.”

In addition, he notes, “The French kids from North Africa are more tied into the Muslim Brotherhood, which says, ‘Obey the laws of the country you’re in, and try to create conditions to live as a Muslim.’ There’s none of this talk about

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**More Muslims Identify With Moderates**

More than half of the Muslims in France and Great Britain believe a struggle is going on in their countries between moderate and fundamentalist Islamic ideologies (top). Those who see such a struggle identify overwhelmingly with the moderates (bottom). Britain has the largest percentage of Muslims identifying with the fundamentalists.

**Do you see a struggle in your country between moderate Muslims and fundamentalists?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>21%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**If so, do you identify more with moderates or fundamentalists?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
<th>Fundamentalists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

creating a separate Islamic state [the radical group] Hizb-ut-Tahrir runs on.”

‘Londonistan’

The shift to religiously oriented politics in Britain took place in the 1980s and ’90s with the increasing embrace of identity politics and the arrival of Islamist political refugees.

After the 1981 rioting in the impoverished Brixton neighborhood of south London, the Scarman Report called for a multiracial, multicultural approach that would recognize the uniquely different needs of ethnic groups. National and local governments awarded funds to groups identifying themselves as ethnic or racial minorities, including ethnic housing associations, arts centers, radio channels and voluntary organizations. Local governments helped set up representative bodies to consult with Muslims over local issues. The funding of conservative religious organizations like the East London Mosque sometimes came at the expense of secular groups, say critics.55

The Rushie affair led to a seminal moment in Muslim identity politics. In 1988 author Salman Rushdie’s novel *The Satanic Verses* infuriated Muslims who felt it ridiculed the Prophet Mohammed. British Muslims formed the U.K. Action Committee on Islamic Affairs to protest the perceived blasphemy. Eventually Iran’s supreme religious leader, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a religious edict known as a *fatwa* condemning Rushdie

Radical Mosque Says It Has Changed

But skeptics say its hard-core views are hidden.

The atmosphere at the East London Mosque during a dinner held recently with non-Muslim neighbors could not have been more congenial or ecumenical.

Ministers from a local interfaith group and executives in suits from a local hospital philanthropy joined bearded Muslims in skullcaps over plates of Indian food as they broke the Ramadan fast. They had just listened to a mosque lecturer declare, “We’re all children of Adam” and “The meaning of Islam isn’t terrorism, destruction or violence.”

But these reassurances seem at odds with the reputation the mosque developed in the 1990s as a center for radical, young Muslims. And some observers of the London Muslim scene say that beneath its smooth public relations efforts the mosque remains a major center for radical Islam.

“The East London Mosque is at the center of a very sophisticated Jamaat-e-Islami network in Britain,” says Martin Bright, political editor for the left-leaning *New Statesman* magazine, referring to the extremist Islamic political party based in Pakistan. “It is essentially the dominant force in the formation of Islamist ideology in Britain — and Europe.” Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamists espouse an Islamic state governed by sharia law.

But on two recent visits to the mosque, including the imam’s weekly Friday sermon, talk of radicalism was absent. Instead the imam admonished the congregation for giving too little to charity. (“You give rice, but it’s probably not even Basmati.”)

Sumaia Begum, 19, a Londoner of Bangladeshi parentage dressed in black from head scarf to figure-concealing skirt, had just listened to the sermon in the secluded second-floor women’s section, crowded with Bangladeshis and Somalis in somber black head-coverings. She seemed unaware of the mosque’s reputation. “I’d love to live in an Islamic state, but bombing innocent people here — that’s not right,” she said. “Bearing and raising children — for us, that is our jihad.”

Critics of Islamist ideology say mosques like East London often have two faces — a moderate one for the public and a hard-core ideology they might only reveal at summer indoctrination camps for young people.

“At the Friday sermon, which is open to the public, they would not preach hatred,” says Irfan Al Alawi, international director of the Center for Islamic Pluralism, a London think tank that promotes religious tolerance. “They would have before 7/7” (the July 7, 2005, London transit bombings). “But when it became obvious they were being investigated because of links with jihadists in Pakistan, they became somewhat cautious.”

Throughout the late 1980s, the mosque, located at the heart of London’s densest Bangladeshi neighborhood, was home to rival Jamaat-e-Islami factions in Britain, according to British author Ed Husain, a former radical who says he first encountered extremist rhetoric at the mosque in the 1990s, when most of its committee members were affiliated with the movement.1

Today, he writes, the Saudi-trained imam of the big mosque continues to lead a faction opposed to modernizing elements and prohibits gatherings of opponents of Islamism and of the strict Saudi version of Islam — Wahhabism.2

But Dilowar Khan, the director of the mosque and the gleaming London Muslim Center next door (built with government, private and Saudi funding), says he and his fellow Muslims at the mosque, like Husain, have moved away from the separatist views espoused in the 1990s, with their single-minded focus on replacing secular regimes in the Muslim world with religious states.

Back then, people were interested in Bangladeshi politics, in which Jamaat-e-Islami was very active, he explains. “Now we’re more interested in how to improve our life and image here.” For instance, he says, the mosque invites local political candidates as speakers and offers various services, ranging from job counseling to computer education.

While the mosque still may have members who are Wahhabis or followers of Jamaat, it does not define itself by any of those sects, according to Khan. He denies any “formal links” to those
groups or to the Tablighi-Jamaat, a hard-line Islamic missionary movement that Al Alawi says has also captured much of the mosque’s leadership.

As for Jamaat-e-Islami’s central mission — to establish a Muslim state — Khan says, “We believe Islam is a complete code of life. . . . What’s wrong with a Muslim country establishing an Islamic state by majority rule?”

What about the party’s call for establishing sharia law? “We’re not interested in implementing sharia law in this country,” he claims. “If the majority of people in Muslim countries want to implement certain laws in their own country, who am I to tell them, ‘Don’t do that?’” Later, he emphasized that sharia is the very essence of the religion, adding, “People who are against sharia law are enemies of Islam.”

Does he advocate sharia courts like those in Nigeria, which order the amputation of limbs and stoning of women as punishments straight from the Koran? “That’s only about 1 percent of sharia law,” he says, which refers to the vast body of religious observance in Islam, including fasting at Ramadan.

Hisham A. Hellyer, an expert on counterterrorism at the University of Warwick and a former visiting fellow at the Washington-based Brookings Institution think tank, says that while Jamaat-e-Islami did have a presence in Britain’s activist groups in the 1980s because of members’ involvement in their home countries, “It’s a bit of a stretch to say they were the direct wings of these organizations in the U.K.” He points out, “It’s not unusual for politicians in Britain to have been communists as students, but they mature and grow up. That’s what happened to leaders in the Muslim community.”

A recent TV documentary dramatized the perception that Muslim mosques are not always what they seem, reporting that Muslim clerics engaged in far more radical language — justifying terrorist bombings, for instance — in private meetings than in public sermons. Since the broadcast, however, some clerics have charged their words were taken out of context. The complaints are being investigated by Britain’s broadcasting watchdog. 1

Such charges and countercharges reflect a problem that Jason Burke, a veteran reporter on the Muslim world for the British Observer (of London), says “confronts me daily as a journalist working in the field. Who are our interlocutors? Whose voices best represent the complex, diverse and dynamic societies that are bundled together in that terrible generalization, the ‘Muslim world?’” 4

Indeed, as France and other nations forced Islamists to leave in the 1990s, members of the French secret service dubbed the British capital “Londonistan” for its role as a refuge for Islamist groups. 57

In the weeks following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many mainstream British news organizations — including the Guardian — accepted that the attacks were a response to suffering in the Palestinian territories and to American support of Is-

2 Ibid., p. 280.
rael. In interviews, young British Muslims said 9/11 and later the London bombings of 2005 made them identify as Muslims more than they had before. After the Iraq War started in 2003, Islamists joined with left-wing groups and created the Respect Party on an anti-war platform. “Radical Islam’s narrative of the victimised ummah [Muslim community] has drawn sustenance from broader public anger at U.S. and U.K. foreign policy,” says Policy Exchange.

Terrorist Attacks

The current wave of terrorism can be traced to Feb. 23, 1998, when al Qaeda issued a fatwa stating that all Muslims had a duty to kill Americans and their allies — civilian or military. Islamic liberation movements began to shift their emphasis to localized, violent jihad.

The Sept. 11, 2001, attacks were directly tied to al Qaeda, as was the attempt three months later by British-born Muslim Richard Reid to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami by lighting explosives in his shoes.

Twenty-nine Muslims living in Spain — including first-generation North Africans from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco — were charged in connection with the March 2004 bombing of four Madrid trains at rush hour, which killed 191 people and injured more than 1,800. The group included petty drug traffickers as well as university students. Jamal Ahmidan, the plot’s Moroccan mastermind, was said to be happily integrated into Spanish society. In October, a Spanish court found 21 people guilty of involvement in the bombing, but three alleged leaders were cleared.

That November, Dutch filmmaker Van Gogh, who had made a film critical of Islam’s treatment of women, was stabbed to death on an Amsterdam street by Mohammed Bouyeri, 26, the Amsterdam-born son of Moroccans. Bouyeri, whose radicalism began during a seven-month period in prison, belonged to the Hofsted Group, which had considered bombing the Dutch parliament.

Until the most recent plots, post-2001 terrorist attempts in Europe had been seen as independently planned, even if the organizers took their inspiration from al Qaeda. That appears to have been the case in the 2005 London bus and subway suicide-bomb attacks. The first attack, on July 7, involved four British Muslims — three Pakistanis from West Yorkshire and an Afro-Caribbean Muslim convert. All four had Westernized, unremarkable backgrounds, according to the NYPD. A second attack, intended for three underground trains and a bus on July 21, failed because the bombs did not detonate.

On Aug. 10, 2006, 23 individuals — most British citizens and nearly all Muslim — were arrested on suspicion of plotting to blow up transatlantic airliners using liquid explosives. Three weeks later a group of Muslims was arrested for running a terrorist training camp at a former convent school in Sussex. A total of 68 people were arrested, and al Qaeda is suspected of being centrally involved in the bomb plot.

Several doctors in England were arrested in two incidents — trying to blow up cars near a London nightclub on June 29 and driving a burning jeep into the Glasgow airport the next day.

Although the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks were directed by al Qaeda, they were planned by a group of English-speaking Muslims at a mosque in Hamburg, where they had been radicalized.

“Without a group of radicalized jihadis who had been homegrown in the West to lead this plot, the chances of 9/11 being a success would have been reduced considerably,” concluded the NYPD intelligence report. “The Hamburg group underwent a process of homegrown radicalization that matched almost exactly those of Madrid, London, Amsterdam.”

But unlike the 7/7 bombers who attacked London, the NYPD observes, when members of the Hamburg group went to Afghanistan to fight, they were re-directed to another target in the West, not to their place of residence.

The North London Central Mosque, better known as the Finsbury Park Mosque, became infamous in the early 2000s for its support of radical Islam under the leadership of its fiery imam, Abu Hamza al-Masri. The mosque’s attendees included shoe bomber Reid and 9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui.

After British police raided the mosque
on Jan. 20, 2003, it eventually was re-
claimed by mainstream Muslims.

However, the London-based think
tank Policy Exchange found extremist
anti-Western, anti-Semitic literature at the
mosque and claims a mosque trustee
has said he is prepared to be a suicide
bomber against Israel, according to a
report released Oct. 30. 65

Since the 2003 raid, law enforcement
and security forces have tried to work
with other mosque leaders to prevent
the incitement to violence that emanated
from Finsbury Park and other Salafi
mosques in London in the 1990s.* Among
the most notorious clerics were:
• Al-Masri, who was sentenced to
seven years for incitement to mur-
der in February 2006;
• Abdullah el-Faisal, a Jamaican-born
convert sentenced to nine years in
2003 for soliciting the murder of
Jews, Americans and Hindus and inciting racial hatred. 66
• Syrian-born self-styled cleric Omar
Bakri Mohammed, who helped
establish the radical group Al Muha-
rijoun and called the 9/11 hijack-
ers the “Magnificent 19,” has been
banned from Britain and currently
lives abroad. 67

Action against radical clerics was au-
thorized by amendments to Britain’s Ter-
rorism Act adopted in 2001, 2005 and
2006, which expanded the definition of
terrorist offenses. The most recent changes
criminalized “incitement to terrorism,”
providing assistance to terrorists and pro-
viding instruction in the use of firearms
and explosives. The British government
also has been given greater ability to
ban political groups. Last year it con-
sidered banning both Hizb ut-Tahrir and
Al Muhajiroun, which are both active on
college campuses. 68

Worsening Threat

The recent string of disrupted plots in
Europe signals a “continuing and
worsening” radicalization within Europe’s
Islamic diaspora and a renewed leader-
ship role for al Qaeda, according to a
recent report from the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a
leading security think tank in London.
Al Qaeda has regrouped as an organi-
zation and now has the capacity to carry
out another 9/11-magnitude attack, ac-
cording to the IISS. 69

Britain is considered the main target,
with up to 30 terrorist plots discovered
there — some that would have involved
mass-casualty suicide attacks, said British
intelligence officials last November. 70 Al
Qaeda’s Pakistan-based leadership was
directing its British followers “on an ex-
tensive and growing scale,” the officials
said, and British authorities said they
have their eye on 2,000 individuals in-
volved in such plots. In fact, said Britain’s
domestic intelligence chief Jonathan Evans
on Nov. 5, terrorist recruitment is ac-
celerating so quickly that there could
now be twice that many — up to 4,000
— potential terrorists living in Britain.
Terrorists are grooming British youths as
young as 15 to aid in terrorism and have
expanded their training bases beyond
Pakistan, specifically to Somalia and other
areas in East Africa. 71

Meanwhile, U.S. officials fear Eu-
rope’s terrorist problems could be ex-
ported to the United States because of
the ease with which Europeans trav-
el to America. “When you talk to in-
telligence officials, that’s their night-
mare,” says the Nixon Center’s Leiken.

Intelligence officials in Denmark and
Washington said at least one suspect in
the abortive Copenhagen bombing had
direct ties to leading al Qaeda figures.
Jakob Scharf, head of Danish intelli-
gence, said Muslim extremists typically
are young men, ages 16-25, courted by
mentors who identify those predisposed
toward a jihadi mindset, radicalize them
and put them in touch with others who
could help them plan violent action.
Denmark became the target of terrorist
groups after a conservative Danish newspaper published cartoons two years ago
widely seen as mocking Islam. 72

Fertile Ground

In the past two decades, Europe and
the United States have become “cru-
cial battlegrounds” in the rapidly in-
tensifying competition between groups
in Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan and
Iran for control of Muslim ideology, ac-
cording to Harvard’s Cesarí. 73

The Saudis spent an estimated $85
billion between 1975 and 2005 to spread
fundamentalist Islam by distributing
Wahhabi prayer books, dispatching mis-
sionaries and imams and building grand
mosques in Madrid, Rome, Copenhagen
and Great Britain. 74

The report released last week by
Policy Exchange found extremist lit-

erature — preaching stoning of adul-
turers, jihad and hatred for non-Mus-
lims — at a quarter of 100 leading

* Salafi is a term applied broadly to sects that

adhere to a supposedly pure form of Islam

that they believe was practiced by Islam’s an-
cestors; it often refers to Wahhabis and some-
times to Deobandis, the Muslim Brotherhood
and Jamaat-e-Islami.

See sidebar, p. 282.

Available online: www.globalresearcher.com

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ultra-conservative Tablighi-Jamaat movement, which consider “recent” innovations, such as the mystically oriented practices of the Sufi Muslims and the worship of saints, as impermissible. Like the political groups, these groups glorify suicide but tend to stress theological and moral, rather than political, arguments.

Europe may have proven fertile ground for strict interpretations of Islam, according to Cesari, because some Muslims react to the bewildering range of moral choices in today’s globalized Western society with a certain “rigidity of thought and total rejections of cultural pluralism.”

But the variety of those arrested for terrorism in recent years suggests there are many reasons young Muslims are drawn to radicalism. For example, about 9 percent are converts, who might have been drawn to other kinds of radical political groups in another era.

For author Husain, one of the few ex-radicals to publicly describe his journey into that world, “it was the serious lack of a sense of belonging here in Britain. We’re all left alone like atoms to do our own thing. There’s no collective entity. In that vacuum, extremists point to other coherent forms of identity, which are very easy to sign up to.”

### Questioning Integration

As concern about radical extremism grows, some European governments are rethinking their approach to integrating Muslims and are demanding more from immigrants who want citizenship, including acceptance of their national values.

“It’s clear the Dutch and British laissez faire models have outlived their usefulness,” says Laurence of Boston College. “No longer will a blank check be given to religious communities to govern themselves. It led to isolation in which a certain extremism thrived.”

In the Netherlands the 90-year-old policy of “pillarization,” which permits each faith to set up its own faith schools and organizations, is falling out of favor among the Dutch as they see their own socially progressive mores conflicting with Muslim values.

Increasingly, politicians on both the left and right in the Netherlands are saying about Muslims: “We have to be intolerant of the intolerant,” says Jan Duyvendak, a professor of sociology at the University of Amsterdam. Applicants for citizenship are shown a film of topless women and two men kissing. The message it’s supposed to send: “If you want to come to the Netherlands, you should be tolerant of this,” he says.

Scandinavian countries also feel that their culture and values, including gender equality, are increasingly threatened by Muslim communities that “we have quite failed to integrate,” Unni Wikan, a professor of social anthropology at the University of Oslo, told a panel recently in London.

Several Scandinavian governments, for example, have outlawed forced marriages of minors, often imported from a Muslim man’s native village or clan. In Norway participation in a forced marriage brings up to 60 years in prison. Denmark requires that spouses brought into the country be at least 24 years old. Other European countries are considering similar laws, says Wikan, because “we’re afraid we’re leading toward a society that’s breaking up into ethnic tribes.”

Scandinavians and the Dutch also have become concerned about honor killings of young Muslim women thought to have dishonored the clan. “That kind of honor code sacrifices women on the altar of culture,” Wikan said. “We don’t want such values to become part of Europe.”

In France, President Nicolas Sarkozy, who campaigned on a law-and-order immigration platform, proposed DNA testing of immigrants’ children seeking to enter the country to prove they’re relatives. He has vowed to expel 25,000 illegal immigrants a year. Sarkozy would also set quotas by geographic regions of the world, an approach immigration historian Weil calls “xenophobic” and which he suspects would be focused on disliked minorities. Sarkozy’s proposed immigration package will produce a “backlash from Arabs and blacks,” Weil warns.

A Belgian proposal to take a tougher stance on immigration, pushed by parties of the right but increasingly adopted by mainstream parties, has been widely interpreted as targeting Muslims.\(^7^8\)
Should the British government fund Muslim faith schools?

Ibrahimm Hewitt
Vice Chairman, Association of Muslim Schools, U.K.
Written for CQ Global Researcher, October 2007

The right of any group to establish a school and have it paid for by the state is enshrined in the 1944 Education Act. This is not limited to people of any particular religious or political background. Section 76 of the act goes on to say that “pupils are to be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents.” These provisions grew out of a compromise between church and state concerning the church-run schools then in operation. The state took over control of some of the schools while leaving others more or less in the control of the church. That is the context in which the state funding of Muslim schools exists.

Critics of faith schools — read “Muslim schools” — claim state funding is a historical anomaly that should be abolished. Proponents believe that parental choice has a firm basis in history, as made clear by Section 76. Choice has long been exercised by Anglican, Roman Catholic and Jewish parents, to little or no criticism. Now, many of the criticisms of faith schools are surfacing with the existence of Muslim schools, which were established by parents not unreasonably asking for the same choice in return for paying the same taxes toward education as everyone else.

Faith plays a hugely important part in the life of most Muslims — the notion of a “secular Muslim” is actually a contradiction in terms — and we are enjoined by the Qur’an to “enter into Islam wholeheartedly” and not make any differentiation between religious and secular. It follows, therefore, that the education of our children should be within a framework that recognizes the existence and importance of their faith background.

As parents, we have a legal, moral and religious duty to raise and educate our children to become upright and honest citizens. The fact that the law of the land encourages the existence of faith schools as a core education provision in Britain means that parents from all faiths and none have a choice about their children’s schools. Those who would have all schools as religion-free zones offer no such choice while overlooking conveniently that a secular approach is not a neutral approach; it is a conscious desire to remove religion from public life — hardly tolerant in a society where many faiths are represented across different communities.

Human-rights legislation makes clear that people should have freedom of religion; to insist on schools in which faith is the only forbidden f-word is both unreasonable and undemocratic. Muslims’ taxes pay for schools of all faiths and none, so why shouldn’t some of those taxes be used to fund Muslim schools as well?

Terry Sanderson
President, National Secular Society
Written for CQ Global Researcher, October 2007

In a country increasingly divided by religion, the prospect of a hundred or more Muslim schools being brought into the state sector is truly terrifying. The British government, by some upside-down logic, has convinced itself that separating children in schools along religious lines will somehow help create “community cohesion.”

The government clings to this opinion in the face of all the evidence. Its own advisers have said Muslim communities are “leading parallel lives,” that we as a nation are “sleepwalking into segregation” and that segregated schools are a “ticking time bomb.”

At present, there are seven Muslim schools paid for by the state. The rest are operating privately. There is little control over what goes on in the fee-paying schools, and the government argues that by bringing them under state control it would be easier to oversee them and ensure that they teach the national curriculum to an acceptable standard.

But the Muslim parents who took their children out of the state system in the first place did so because they felt that what the state offered was not what they wanted. If the state is not going to provide the strictly Islamic education they desire for their children, then they will simply opt out again and set up more private schools. The state will have to compromise if it wants these people on board.

So, rather than the national curriculum changing Muslim schools, it will be Muslim schools that force the national curriculum to change. Before long we will have schools where girls are forced to wear veils. (This has already been advocated by a leading Muslim educator, even for non-Muslim pupils who might seek a place in the school.) We will have state schools where swimming lessons are not permitted, where male teachers cannot teach girls, where there is no music, no representative art and no sporting activities for females unless they are “modestly dressed” in flowing garments.

Because the Church of England and the Catholic Church have traditionally operated about one-third of Britain’s state school system, it is now difficult to argue that other religions should not be permitted to have their own “faith schools.” But by permitting Islamic schools into the state system, the government is colluding in the very thing it insists it is against — the further separation of an already-isolated community.

The only way out of this unholy mess is to dismantle the whole system of state-operated religious schools and return them to community control.
Continued from p. 286

Changing Course

A British government report earlier this year moved away from the language of multiculturalism, saying friendships with people from other ethnic groups are the best way to prevent prejudice. Prime Minister Brown has also said a sense of Britishness should be the “glue” tying different ethnic groups together. But some teachers are uncomfortable with new requirements that schools teach patriotism, because they are unsure what it is. 79

After the foiled June plots in Britain and Glasgow, Brown proposed a three-year, $114-million program to win the hearts and minds of Muslims by conducting citizenship classes in Britain’s 1,000 madrasas and English-language training for imams.

But Faiz Siddiqui, convenor of the Muslim Action Committee representing more than 700 mosques and imams in Britain, pointed out that “excessive sums of money” — by one estimate $14 billion over the last 25 years — were already coming into the country from Saudi Arabia and other countries to support “radical ideology.” He also noted that some imams accused of inciting people to murder, like Abu Hamza, already spoke English. 80

In an investigative report published last year, the New Statesman’s Bright found that the British government’s main partner in the Muslim community — the Muslim Council of Britain — had links to the religious right both at home and abroad. Leaked memos revealed that the government’s decision to make the group its main link to the Muslim community had been heavily influenced by the British Foreign Office, which wanted to maintain connections with opposition movements abroad. 81

After the report was published, then-Communities Secretary Kelly focused on reaching out to other groups in the community and halted communication altogether with the council, says Bright. One reason for the switch, she said, was the council’s boycott of Britain’s Holocaust Memorial Day. How Brown will eventually re-connect with the nation’s Muslim community remains uncertain.

However, in a speech delivered Oct. 31, Brown’s Communities Secretary Blears said the current government “remains absolutely committed” to Blair’s shift in priority away from reliance on a few national organizations and toward Muslim groups “actively working to tackle violent extremism.” 82

Muslim Schools

Britain’s education department in September recommended that the more than 100 private Muslim schools enter the state-supported system and that faith schools generally should be expanded. The proposal received a deeply divided response. 83 (See “At Issue,” p. 287.)

The nation’s teachers’ union expressed concern that the proposal could further divide children ethically. Moreover, there’s no requirement that Muslim schools cover other religions in depth, “which we consider appropriate,” said Alison Ryan, policy adviser to the Association of Teachers and Lecturers.

Some moderate Muslims worry the faith schools could become breeding grounds for extremism. Earlier this year, the principal of King Fahd Academy in London confirmed its textbooks described Jews as “apes” and Christians as “pigs” and refused to withdraw them. 84

Almost half of Britain’s mosques are under the control of the conservative Deobandis, who gave rise to the Taliban in Afghanistan, according to a police report cited by the London Times in September. 85 And many of them run after-school madrasas that could be expanded into state-funded faith schools, some moderate Muslims fear.

But even groups concerned about ethnic separateness acknowledge that a country that supports nearly 7,000 faith schools — mostly Church of England and Catholic — cannot discriminate against Muslims, who currently have only seven state-supported schools. 86 And some hope that with greater government oversight of the curriculum, any tendency toward extremism would be limited.

Encouraging Moderation

Concerned that its terrorism problem is largely homegrown, the British government is now trying to curb radicalism. Among other things, the government is trying to encourage moderation by creating a program to educate imams in communicating with young people to reject extremist views and minimum standards for Muslim clerics in prisons and other public institutions to give them the skills to confront and isolate extremists. It is also supporting local governments that are developing their own accreditation programs for imams employed in their city to help them deliver sermons in English, reach out to young people and resist extremist ideology. All these steps are part of a $114 million program announced by Communities Secretary Blears Oct. 31 to build resilience to violent extremism, including citizenship classes in mosque schools. 87

The government is also using community-policing techniques to get to know Muslims in the neighborhoods where they think terrorists may be living. Dutch, Spanish and Danish authorities are closely watching Britain’s approach to see if it stems the tide of radical recruitment.

Next year, a year-old government-backed group aimed at encouraging moderation in mosques, the Mosques and Imams Advisory Board, plans to issue a code of standards to allow its member
mosques and imams to be supervised and regulated. The draft code, the Observer reported, would require members to offer programs “that actively combat all forms of violent extremism.” Imams would also be expected to make clear to their followers that forced marriages are completely “unIslamic” — as is violence in domestic disputes. 88

As Oxford University Professor of European Studies Timothy Garton Ash recently observed: “So much now depends on whether the 10 percent” who sympathize with suicide bombers “veer toward the barbaric 1 percent” who thought the London subway bombers were justified or “rejoin the civilized majority.” 89

But Klausen of Brandeis University says that while Britain’s new approach has succeeded in establishing links to Muslim leaders, so far it “has failed to build trust among the general Muslim public.” 90

British author Husain says government officials mistakenly think they can deal with radical Islamists’ demands rationally. Secular Western leaders have trouble connecting with the annihilation of the West as a religious duty, he says, because they “don’t do God.”

“Which Islamist demand do you want to do business with?” he asks. “The destruction of Israel? The overthrow of secular government? The establishment of the caliphate? I don’t see any of those being up for negotiation,” Husain says.

At the same time, it’s important not to confuse all conservative religious groups with those committed to terrorism, warns counterterrorism expert Hellyer.

“In a lot of public discourse we have accusations,” he says, such as, “This Salafi mosque or this Salafi preacher is 100 percent guilty of all the radical ideologies in the U.K.” In fact, he notes, most Salafi Muslims are zealously conservative but not necessarily violent. Those at the Brixton London mosque first attended by shoe bomber Reid tried to dissuade him from radical theologies that preached violence, and as he became increasingly radical he left the mosque. 91

“I would hate for us to waste resources going after people we don’t like rather than people who are a dangerous threat,” Hellyer says.

Following the 2005 bombings, the British government launched an Islamic “Scholars’ Roadshow” aimed at winning the minds of under-30 Muslims on issues like jihad and extremism. The Muslim magazine Q-News, which came out early against suicide bombing, helped organize the event because it agreed with the government that “there needs to be a theological response to violent Islam-inspired radicalism,” says contributing editor Malik.

More than 30,000 young Muslims attended — a sign of success. “But we also fought a significant segment of the Muslim community who said: ‘Are you promoting Blair’s Islam?’ ” Malik adds.

The British government’s tactic of using ‘good’ Islam to fight ‘bad’ Islam is likely to be of limited success because it assumes that religious interpretation — not politics — drives radical movements, Brandeis University’s Klausen suggests. Terrorists today meet at jihadist video stores, at Internet cafes and in prison — not in mosques, she says. Communities Secretary Blears recently acknowledged this reality, saying the government’s new program to counter violent extremism would reach out to young people on the Internet, in cafes, bookshops and gyms. Yet it’s hard for outsiders to know which theology to back. The roadshow, for instance, aroused bitter criticism in the press for supporting conservative interpretations of Islam. 92

The German government, by contrast, has resisted efforts to create a “tame” Islam, saying the state shouldn’t influence the theological development of Islam. 93

Yet the need for Islam-based opposition to extremism is why political moderates like Malik think it was significant when a former senior member of Hizbut Tahrir recently denounced the radical group on the BBC. “Here’s a guy who in very measured language is saying, ‘I reject on theological and philosophical grounds the ideology of an Islamic state,’ ” while remaining a Muslim, says Malik. He’s opening a debate that “needs to happen on Muslim terms.”

Winning that debate will be the real challenge, says journalist Bright, and not just because the West is frightened of terrorism. “If people are prepared to blow up individual innocents in atrocities, then we all know what we think about that,” he observes. “More difficult is what we do about separatist, totalitarian ideologies and their effects on our young people. That to me is a more serious problem, because far more people are susceptible to that than to becoming terrorists.”

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**Notes**


5 Perlez, op. cit.


8 “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” FBI Intelligence Division, 2007, p. 5. Preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalization of individuals is one part of British intelligence service’s four-point strategy: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. See also


14 Ibid.


21 Ibid.


23 Presentation by John R. Bowen, University of Chicago International Forum, London, Sept. 29, 2007, as part of “Engaging Cultural Differences in Western Europe” panel.


25 Ibid.


29 Phillips, op. cit., p. 22.


35 Phillips, op. cit., p. 25.


37 Mirza, et al., op. cit., pp. 6, 18.


40 Leiken, op. cit.


44 Ibid.


48 Ibid., p. 27.

49 Ibid.


53 Ibid., pp. 99-100.


55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., pp. 27-28.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., p. 29.

59 Klausen, op. cit., pp. 14-15. For background, see Peter Katel, “Global Jihad,” CQ Researcher,

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61 NYPD Intelligence Division, op. cit.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 15.
64 Ibid.
68 Klausen, op. cit.
73 Cesari, op. cit., p. 96.
75 Ibid., p. 92.
80 McVeigh, op. cit.
81 Bright, op. cit., p. 28.
90 Klausen, op. cit.
92 Klausen, op. cit.
93 International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 31.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Association of Muslim Schools UK. P.O. Box 14109, Birmingham B6 9BN, United Kingdom; +44-845-882-0407; www.ams-uk.org. A Birmingham-based group that “supports and develops excellence in full-time Muslim schools” in the United Kingdom.

Center for Islamic Pluralism. (202) 232-1750; www.islamicpluralism.eu. A Washington-based think tank that is critical of radical Muslim groups.

Centre for Social Cohesion. 77 Great Peter St., Westminster, London SW1P 2EZ, United Kingdom; +44-20-7799-6677; www.socialcohesion.co.uk. A British group critical of Britain’s multicultural policy.

Hizb ut-Tahrir. www.hizb.org.uk. Considered one of the more radical Islamic organizations in Britain.


Liberty. 21 Tabard St., London SE1 4LA, United Kingdom; +44-20-7403-8888; www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk. London-based group, also known as the National Council for Civil Liberties, that advocates for civil liberties.

Muslim Council of Britain. P.O. Box 57330, London E1 2WJ, United Kingdom; +44-845-26-26-786; www.mcb.org.uk. Represents more than 500 Muslim groups, mosques and schools in Britain.

National Secular Society. 25 Red Lion Square, London WC1R 4RL, United Kingdom; +44-20-7404-3126; www.secularism.org.uk. A London-based group that opposes faith schools in Britain.

Policy Exchange. Clutha House, 10 Storey’s Gate, London SW1P 3AY, United Kingdom; +44-20-7340-2650; www.policyexchange.org.uk. A London-based think tank that opposes the British government’s multicultural policy and choice of Muslim groups to support.


Stop Islamisation of Europe. +44-122-854-7317; sioe.wordpress.com. A Danish group that has been coordinating street protests in Europe against Islamist stances on issues like sharia.
Books
A Washington University anthropologist looks at the furor that led to the 2004 ban on head scarves in French schools.

The director of Harvard University’s Islam in the West program compares the experiences of European and U.S. Muslims.

A former Muslim radical in London describes his recruitment by extremist Islamist groups in the 1990s.

A University of Bristol sociologist advocates “multicultural citizenship” to integrate Muslims in Britain.

A journalist blames the rise of Muslim radicalism in London on persistent denial by the British government and a craven form of multiculturalism among leftists.

A leader of the Muslim Brotherhood wrote this inspirational text for radical Islamist groups while in an Egyptian prison.

Influential jihadist thinkers Maududi and Qutb held more rigid views of sharia than many scholars.

Reports and Studies
The group argues that France’s policy of deporting imams and others it considers Islamic fundamentalists violates human rights.

Issued before the latest foiled plot in Germany, this report downplayed the threat of homegrown terrorism in Germany’s Turkish community.

The separatist British group lays out its argument for a caliphate in the Muslim world and denies it espouses violence.

Muslim terrorists in Europe were generally “well-integrated” into their home countries, according to this study.

Articles
France is doing a better job of absorbing Muslims than other European countries.

The Muslim Brotherhood has moved away from violence in favor of using the electoral process to obtain its goal of an Islamic state in Egypt, France, Jordan, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and the United Kingdom, say leaders.

A former senior member of the radical group Hizb ut-Tahrir says he left the group because it preached violence.

The group visited leading mosques and schools in Britain and found extremist literature preaching hatred against non-Muslims, anti-Semitism and stoning of adulterers.

A conservative think tank in London blames British multiculturalism policies for dividing people along ethnic lines.
Citizenship

Then-British Chancellor Gordon Brown said new immigrants must do community work and prove they support British values.

Amid a burgeoning Muslim population, German and Dutch officials defend citizenship tests that ask about newcomers’ values.

Civil Liberties

British Cabinet member Jack Straw’s opposition to Muslim face veils has been criticized as unacceptably prescriptive.

European and U.S. counterterrorism policies need to balance human rights while protecting national security.

Phillips, Melanie, “Yes, the Terror Threat Is Real But We Must Stop and Question This,” Daily Mail (England), May 28, 2007.
Proposed British security measures may only fuel murderous resentment from Muslim extremists.

Extremism

Islamic leaders are denouncing U.S. and European foreign policies as significant factors in fomenting extremism.

Five mosques in Bristol, England, have formed an organization dedicated to eradicating religious extremism.

The former British prime minister says that in the era of globalization, the outcome of the clash between Islamic extremism and progress will determine Europe’s future.

Multiculturalism

Islamic Studies departments in British universities are failing to meet the needs of the country’s multicultural society.

Multicultural separateness in Britain has left the country’s Muslims mired in poverty, unemployment and ill health.

A backlash over a Danish cartoon depicting the Prophet Mohammed has caused Europe to defend its values.

Social Integration

After several murders and bombings, many European nations are eyeing stricter integration standards for Muslims.

Muslim integration into Ireland includes a significant increase in the number of doctors, businessmen and technology professionals.

Half-hearted German efforts at Muslim integration have created a troubled immigrant population.

After rioting by Muslim youths concerned about unemployment, France has an opportunity to reverse neglect of the Islamic community.

CITING CQ GLOBAL RESEARCHER

Sample formats for citing these reports in a bibliography include the ones listed below. Preferred styles and formats vary, so please check with your instructor or professor.

MLA STYLE

APA STYLE

CHICAGO STYLE
Voices From Abroad:

MOHAMED ABDUL BARI
Chairman, East London Mosque

Freedom of speech has limits
“Muslims [must] express their feelings peacefully and will call upon the newspapers concerned to apologise for the enormous offence [Mohammed cartoon] and distress caused. The hallmark of any civilized society is not just that it allows freedom of speech, but that it accepts this freedom also has limits.”

The Independent (England), February 2006

ALI SELIM
Secretary-General
Irish Council of Imams

Perpetrators don’t speak for all
“In some parts of the world acts of violence against innocent people have created an unhealthy atmosphere which allowed Islamophobia to flourish. To stigmatise every Muslim for a crime perpetrated by a Muslim is just like stigmatising every Christian for a crime perpetrated by a Christian. It is not fair and is absurd.”

The Irish Times, April 2007

SALMA YAQOOB
Councillor; Sparkbrook,
Birmingham, England

Citizenship classes are useless
“Muslims in this country are already British. If Muslims are singled out for citizenship classes, it will only alienate them and make them feel like they are not really British at all. The Muslim community has already condemned extremism. You can’t stop extremism through citizenship classes alone.”

Birmingham Evening Mail (England), May 2006

WOLFGANG SCHAEBLE
Interior Minister Germany

Our country, our values
“Islam is part of us now. That means Muslims must adapt and not just pay lip service to doing so. They must put up with cartoons, gender equality, possibly insulting criticism — all this is part of our open society.”


AL-MAKTOUN INSTITUTE
FOR ARABIC AND
ISLAMIC STUDIES
Dundee, Scotland

Education promotes understanding
“There must be better education at university level on Islam and Muslims in today’s world, which reflects the needs of our contemporary multicultural society. It is only through multicultural education that we can work to eliminate extremism and fundamentalism.”

Time For Change report, October 2006

DALIL BOUBAKEUR
Chairman, French Council of the Muslim Faith

A religion of peace
“The Prophet founded not a terrorist religion, but on the contrary, a religion of peace. We attach enormous importance to this image and we will not allow it to be distorted. I myself oppose the extremist forms of Islam; we reject this parallel.”

Liberation.fr (France), February 2006

BASSAM TIBI
Professor of International Relations, University of Gottingen, Germany

Riots in France pose warning for Europe
“The explosions now are in France, but other countries are sitting on the same time bomb; it’s a European time bomb. This is a warning for Europe from the ‘no-future’ Muslim kids whose lives are wasting all over the continent. Without change, the fighting will come to the streets of Berlin, Amsterdam wherever.”

Boston Globe, November 2005

TONY BLAIR
Then-Prime Minister
United Kingdom

Attacking absurd ideas is crucial
“This terrorism will not be defeated until its ideas, the poison that warps the minds of its adherents, are confronted, head-on, in their essence, at their core. By this I don’t mean telling them terrorism is wrong. I mean telling them their attitude to America is absurd; their concept of governance pre-feudal; their positions on women and other faiths, reactionary and regressive.”

Evening Standard (England), March 2006

CHRISTO KOMARNITSKI, BULGARIA