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Washington
The brutal assassination of the Lebanese Christian
politician Pierre Gemayel is a devastating blow to a country
already in turmoil after this summer’s Hezbollah war against
Israel. Like Hassan Nasrallah’s attack on the Jewish state,
undertaken without any consultation with other Lebanese
leaders, the killing of the 34-year-old Gemayel cannot but
appear as an element in a ‘strategy of tension’ aimed at the
destruction of a nascent democracy. In the United States,
the administration immediately identified the government of
Prime Minister Fuad Siniora as the main target of the
terrorist act.
Syria, which more or less automatically appears as the main
suspect in this and other Lebanese atrocities, including the
killing of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, has
officially denounced the killing of Gemayel as ‘a despicable
crime’. Many Lebanese — Christian, Muslim and Druze — have
grown so to resent their ‘big brother’ that they will
doubtless blame Syria. But it would seem to make little
sense for Damascus to have done it, since it has just gained
a psychological victory by re-establishing diplomatic
relations with Iraq after 26 years.
Iraq and Syria had adopted a new, joint approach to the
abatement of terrorism in the territories under Baghdad’s
authority. The bad blood between the Iraqi and Syrian
Baathists was little understood in the West. Although both
countries were ruled by branches of the Baath party, little
love was lost between these two branches. The Syrian
Baathist regime is dominated by a military caste
historically associated with the Alawite sect, an Islamic
tradition emerging from Shiism, but so heterodox in its
theology that many Shias doubt it can be included in the
Islamic global community, or umma.
The Iraqi Baath was and remains a legacy of Sunni dominance
in Iraq. In addition, the break between Syria and Iraq a
quarter of a century ago was motivated by Syrian sympathy
for Iran in the war between Tehran and the Saddam
dictatorship. Notwithstanding reams of disinformation, there
is little evidence that Syria encouraged Sunni violence in
Iraq.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what serious contribution
Syria could make to the normalisation of life in Iraq —
except to build a high physical barrier that would prevent
Sunni jihadist recruits, most of them Wahabis from Saudi
Arabia, from exploiting Syria’s porous border. (Saudi Arabia
has, finally, ordered the construction of a security fence
along its extended border with its northern neighbour, to
cut off direct infiltration to the terror front.) But before
Syria can be expected to contribute positively to the
stabilisation of Iraq, it must satisfy the world that it
will contribute even more to peace in Lebanon.
Who, aside from the Syrians, could be serious suspects in
the death of Pierre Gemayel? Hezbollah would, of course, be
the second on most lists. In the logic of Sheik Nasrallah’s
Mussolinian march to power, yet another unexpected assault
on Lebanese peace makes sense. Such a move would illustrate
a distinction between Islamofascism as a form of established
state ideology, such as we see in Saudi Arabia, and
Islamofascism as a roadmap to dictatorship. Muslim
intellectuals in the Middle East do not, let it be noted,
huffily reject the term ‘Islamofascism’ as a slur on their
religion, as British and US Muslim leaders are wont to do.
As one authoritative Iranian told me, ‘There is clearly a
fascistic reading of Islam, and it is absurd to deny it.
Western academics may believe fascism is limited in space
and time, but we Muslims who have experienced fascist
tendencies in the Islamic world know better.’
Sheik Nasrallah brought war to northern Israel and southern
Lebanon in a demonstration of an unscrupulous will to power.
Most recently, he has called for street protests against the
Siniora administration. Because Shia Muslims will never
constitute an overwhelming majority in Lebanon, as they do
in Iran, Hezbollah cannot expect to establish a clerical
state in Beirut. But it can still rule, even indirectly — by
pushing all other political forces aside. Nasrallah would
not be the first political adventurer to gain power by
destroying his extremist peers and rivals.
It is precisely the multiconfessional nature of Lebanese
society that makes the killing of Gemayel so dangerous.
Rafik Hariri was a Muslim, and the probability that he was
killed on the order of other Muslims was disturbing. But
Gemayel was the scion of a leading political dynasty among
Christians — and the probability that a Muslim group killed
a Christian leader is nothing less than terrifying. Pierre’s
grandfather, also Pierre, was founder of the right-wing and
authoritarian Phalange party, and his relatives served in
various Lebanese governments.
The killing of Pierre Gemayel, who was industry minister, is
a slap in the face of every Lebanese who seeks peace and a
chance for democracy, but it is, unquestionably, mainly an
attack on the security of Christians. It is therefore
reasonable also to consider the Sunni terrorists in Iraq,
al-Qa’eda, and their backers in Saudi Arabia as major
suspects.
When Rafik Hariri was killed, responsibility was claimed by
Wahabi extremists in Lebanon, although there was little
mention of it in the Western media. In addition, Saudi
dissidents pointed out the connections of the Hariri family
to the Saudi royal family, and argued that he had been
liquidated in anticipation of the death of Saudi King Fahd.
Fahd died, after years of lingering, immobilising illness,
less than six months after Hariri’s murder, and much of his
wealth was managed by Hariri. This led to suspicion about a
prospective fight among Fahd’s successors over the spoils —
with Hariri caught in the crossfire.
The United Nations has carried out an investigation of the
Hariri death, and the Siniora government only last week
approved Lebanese participation in a UN tribunal to try
Lebanese and Syrian suspects. That decision was taken
against the strenuous objection of pro-Syrian ministers in
the Beirut government, including Shias — and six ministers
resigned. Though it would be too easy to consider the
Gemayel hit a follow-up to the disagreements over the Hariri
tribunal by the Shia radicals, some observers will doubtless
argue the case.
Al-Qa’eda in Iraq has long threatened to spread its terror
campaign to Lebanon, and would, as in Iraq, show no
hesitation in killing a leading Christian. In the United
States, Syrian responsibility for the death of Gemayel is
taken by many as something close to a given. There is
cynicism in the air. Insiders in Washington were this week
speculating sourly about James Baker’s Iraq Study Group, due
to report next month. The question was being asked: will
Baker and co now advocate a new approach by the US to Syria
and Iran? Will they be less keen to open up dialogue?
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!["Salaat ul-janaza [Funeral service] of Sayyid Muhammad ibn Alawi Al Maliki, The Grand Mosque in Mecca, October 2004](../images/janazahmalki.JPG)
